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Sterilization is one of the most frequently chosen forms of contra-
ception in the world;1 many persons who do not want to have children
select this simple, safe, and effective means of avoiding unwanted preg-
nancy. For individuals who are mentally disabled, however, sterilization
has more ominous associations. Until recently, involuntary sterilization
was used as a weapon of the state in the war against mental deficiency.
Under eugenic sterilization laws in effect in many states, retarded persons
were routinely sterilized without their consent or knowledge. 2
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1. See Isaacs, Reproductive Rights-1983: An International Survey, 14 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L.
REv. 311, 328 (1983) (90 to 100 million couples worldwide choose sterilization as a method of
contraception). In the United States, sterilization is the most popular form of birth control for
couples over thirty, and it rivals the Pill as a method of contraception for all couples. Id.
Salpingectomy (tubal ligation) is a surgical procedure by which the fallopian tubes are tied and
severed. There are many different methods of performing tubal ligation, ranging from abdominal
incisions to laparoscopy, a microsurgical procedure. See R. HATCHER, F. GUEST, F. STEWART, G.
STEWART, J. TRUSSELL, S. CEREL & W. CATES, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1986-1987, at
283-93 (1986) [hereinafter CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY]. Vasectomy, the most effective means of
male fertility control, is a surgical excision of the vas deferens (a duct that carries sperm). Id. at 104,
281-83.
2. For a discussion of the eugenic sterilization movement of the early twentieth century, see
infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. See generally Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbe-
ciles, New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 (1985). It is estimated that almost
64,000 persons had been involuntarily sterilized under state eugenic sterilization laws by 1963. The
practice was most prevalent in California (20,108 sterilizations), Virginia (7162 sterilizations), and
North Carolina (6297 sterilizations). EUGENIC STERILIZATION app. at 1 (J. Robitscher ed. 1973).
In Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 152, 707 P.2d 760, 765, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392
(1985), the California Supreme Court noted that California led the nation in eugenic sterilization.
This factor may have influenced the legislature's enactment of a law barring the sterilization of
STERILIZATION
Sterilization law has undergone a radical transformation in recent
years.3 Influenced by a distaste for eugenic sterilization and a desire to
redress past injustices, the emerging law seeks to protect the interests of
mentally disabled persons by erecting formidable barriers to sterilization.
The policy goals of this reform movement are commendable. However,
in its singleminded effort to prevent erroneous sterilizations, the law de-
parts from what would be its underlying objectives: to protect where
possible the individual's right to make her 4 own reproductive decisions
and to ensure that any decision made by others will best protect her
interests.
Current law purports to protect the individual's reproductive rights,
but the focus is one-sided. Although the law protects the "right to pro-
create," it does so by unnecessarily burdening the reciprocal right not to
procreate. The option of sterilization-seen as a legitimate exercise of
the right of reproductive privacy when chosen by the normal person-
may be unavailable to the retarded person. Despite rhetorical emphasis
on the importance of reproductive autonomy, the paternalistic stance of
the law improperly limits the freedom of some persons who may be capa-
ble of making their own reproductive choices. In many states, only a
court acting as decisionmaker is deemed capable of protecting disabled
persons from those who would violate their rights.
The assumption that the law's overriding purpose is to protect the
right to procreate arises from the historical and political context of the
incompetents. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (1981). This statutory provision was struck down in
Valerie N.
3. The sterilization law reform movement is largely embodied in a series of judicial opinions
beginning in 1980 with the Washington Supreme Court case of In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93
Wash. 2d 228, 239, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980). See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. See
also Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 369 (D. Conn. 1978); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 614
(Alaska 1981); Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 160, 707 P.2d at 771-72, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399; In re A.W.,
637 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1981); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 703, 447
A.2d 1244, 1254 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 559, 432
N.E.2d 712, 716 (1982); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 271-72, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980); In re
Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 258-62, 426 A.2d 467, 479-81 (1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378
N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 564-68, 450 A.2d 1376,
1382-84 (1982); In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578-79, 307 N.W.2d 881, 899
(1981). Several states have enacted reform statutes in recent years. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-78y(b) (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7001-7017 (Supp. 1986); OR.
REv. STAT. § 436.305(3) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(4) (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 8705 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.10 to .12 (1982). For a discussion of the reform
laws, see infra notes 31-58 and accompanying text.
4. This article uses the feminine pronoun to refer to the mentally retarded person for whom
sterilization is proposed because it appears that the issue arises much more frequently with females
than with males. For example, all cases cited supra note 3 involved females. Furthermore, some of
the analysis, such as that involving the intrusiveness of hysterectomy, applies only to females. None-
theless, much of the analysis applies to both males and females.
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reform movement. It is not based on a careful analysis of the retarded
person's interest in reproductive autonomy and how this interest may be
affected by her disability. There is an understandable reluctance to un-
dertake such analysis; even asking the question implies differences in the
interests of retarded and nonretarded people. However, the failure to
discern the actual interests at stake can lead to erroneous decisions con-
trary to the normative objective of the law.
This article focuses on parents' efforts to obtain sterilization of their
mentally retarded children. As a result of the trend toward deinstitution-
alization, a growing number of mentally disabled individuals live with
their parents. Because current law reacts primarily to the state's histori-
cal wrongful treatment of institutionalized persons, 5 it is not sufficiently
responsive to the needs of retarded individuals who live with their
families.6
Part I of the article describes the current law and explores how its
paternalistic approach fails to protect the interests of mentally disabled
persons when their parents propose sterilization. 7 Part II develops an
alternative approach, which I will call the "autonomy model. ' 8 This
model is developed primarily through an analysis of the effects of mental
disability on three dimensions of the disabled person's reproductive inter-
est-avoiding unwanted pregnancy, having children, and making auton-
omous choices. Part III explores the implications of the autonomy
model for the formulation of an optimal sterilization rule.9 The model
suggests that the law should maximize individual and family autonomy
and minimize paternalistic intervention by the state. The goal of protect-
ing the retarded person's interests is largely achieved by choosing the
appropriate decisionmaker; in most cases this will be the individual her-
self or her parents. Under this approach, the court's role in most cases is
limited to deciding whether the individual has the capacity to make her
own choices or whether her parents must make the decision for her.
5. Many eugenic sterilization laws, directed toward institutionalized patients, authorized the
director of such facilities to make the decision or to petition a court. In Ruby v. Massey, 452 F.
Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978), a Connecticut law that permitted sterilization only of mentally disabled
individuals in institutions was struck down on equal protection grounds. Id. at 367-69. Some laws
required sterilization as a precondition to release from state institutions. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 204 (1927).
6. Indeed, most of the judicial opinions developing the paternalism model involved efforts by a
parent or guardian to sterilize a child cared for at home. See, e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 240-42,
251, 426 A.2d 467, 469-70, 475 (1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 296-97, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989,
989-90 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
7. See infra notes 10-61 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 62-139 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 140-80 and accompanying text.
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I. CURRENT STERILIZATION LAW: A PATERNALISM MODEL
A. The Context of Reform.
Three factors have stimulated and shaped the reform of sterilization
law: the discrediting of the eugenic theory, the development of the con-
stitutional doctrine of reproductive privacy, and the changing conception
of mental retardation. The vigilant stance of current law is largely a re-
sponse to the unsavory history of eugenic sterilization in this country.10
During the first half of this century, laws in many states authorized ster-
ilization of mentally deficient persons and others believed to be societal
burdens." These laws were based largely on eugenic theory, which en-
joyed considerable popularity in the progressive era. The theory posited
that intelligence and most personality traits are genetically based and are
predictably inherited by children from their parents. 12 The objective of
10. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 559, 432 N.E.2d 712, 717 (1982) ("We are well aware of the
sordid history of compulsory eugenic sterilization laws in the United States."); Grady, 85 N.J. at
245, 426 A.2d at 472 ("[W]e have serious doubts about the scientific validity of eugenic steriliza-
tion."); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) ("[T]he
theoretical foundation for eugenic sterilization as a method of improving society has been dis-
proved."). Rejection of compulsory sterilization laws on scientific and social policy grounds has had
broad support in the legal literature since the 1960's. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch
is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995,
1033-34 (1977); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591,
619-25 (1966); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
917, 934-35 (1974); Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory, and
Policy Alternaties, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 980-83 (1982).
11. Sterilization laws were directed at the mentally retarded, mentally ill, epileptic, and crimi-
nal populations. Indiana passed the first involuntary sterilization law in 1907. Act of March 9,
1907, ch. 215, 1907 IND. AcTs 377 (repealed 1963). By 1925, twenty-three states had passed eugenic
sterilization laws. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1418, 1433 (1981). As late as 1966, twenty-six states had eugenic sterilization laws. Ferster,
supra note 10, at 596. State courts often upheld sterilization laws using two police power justifica-
tions-that of preventing the birth of defective children and that of lowering the public welfare
expense of supporting children whose parents could not support them. See In re Simpson, 180
N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962); Ferster, supra note 10, at 609.
Some sterilization laws were used to punish habitual criminals and rapists. A Washington stat-
ute authorizing the sterilization of convicted rapists was upheld in State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 66,
126 P. 75, 76 (1912). The United States Supreme Court, however, struck down an Oklahoma statute
allowing sterilization of habitual criminals in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
542-43 (1942). Some statutes had paternalistic objectives and authorized sterilization if it was in the
best interest of the individual and society. Virginia's sterilization statute was enacted in part to
alleviate fears that institutionalized individuals returning to society would produce children. See
Act of March 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 VA. AcTs 569, 569 (amended and rec6dified 1968).
12. The eugenic movement was an outgrowth of Mendelian genetics. The eugenicists, building
upon Mendel's findings about the hereditability of physical traits, argued that intelligence, personal-
ity, and even character traits such as dishonesty, criminality, and laziness were directly "transmit-
ted." See H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENIC STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 369 (1922).
Furthermore, certain traits were associated with racial or national groups. Id. at 372-92 (listing
"human traits which have been shown to follow definite rules of inheritance"). This view served as
the basis for the Nazi eugenic policies. The accepted view was that defectives were reproducing
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the eugenic sterilization laws was to protect and improve society by
preventing reproduction by those who might produce defective off-
spring. 13
In 1927, the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell 14 upheld Virginia's ster-
more quickly than normal people, thus posing a significant threat to society. For an excellent histor-
ical account of the eugenic movement, see Cynkar, supra note 11, at 1420-35.
13. See H. LAUGHLIN, supra note 12, at 369 ("[D]efectives who are practically certain to breed
principally defectives, owe a debt to the community that can be discharged only by an adequate
guarantee that they shall not contribute to the next generation."). The following quote reveals the
threat to society that eugenicists thought the mentally retarded posed:
The past few years have witnessed a striking awakening of professional and popular
consciousness of the widespread prevalence of feeblemindedness and its influence as a
source-of wretchedness to the patient himself and to his family, and as a causative factor in
the production of crime, prostitution, pauperism, illegitimacy, intemperance, and other
complex social diseases.... The feebleminded are a parasitic, predatory class, never capa-
ble of self-support or of managing their own affairs.... They cause unutterable sorrow at
home and are a menace and danger to the community .... Feebleminded women are
almost invariably immoral and if at large usually become carriers of venereal disease or
give birth to children who are as defective as themselves.... Every feebleminded person,
especially the high-grade imbecile, is a potential criminal, needing only the proper environ-
ment and opportunity for the development and expression of his criminal tendencies.
S. DAviEs, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE FEEBLEMINDED 56 (1923), quoted in Cynkar, supra note 11,
at 1424-25.
A,1934 law review note, arguing for a sterilization law in Kentucky, also reflects this perception
of societal threat: "Since time immemorial, the criminal and defective have been the 'cancer of
society.' Strong, intelligent, useful families are becoming smaller and smaller; while irresponsible,
diseased, defective families are becoming larger. The result can only be race degeneration." Note, A
Sterilization Statute for Kentucky?, 23 Ky. L.J. 168, 168 (1934), quoted in Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
supra note 10, at 998.
14. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Prior to Buck v. Bell, most courts struck down sterilization
statutes as unconstitutional. See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (cruel and unu-
sual punishment grounds), rev'd as moot, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 528,
131 N.E. 2, 2 (1921) (due process grounds); Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 145, 166 N.W. 938,
941 (1918) (equal protection grounds); see also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 10, at 1000-01
nn.44-48; Ferster, supra note 10, at 593-94 nn.1 1-12.
Buck Y. Bell is often cited to illustrate the abuses of eugenic sterilization policy. Bell was the
test case for Virginia's new sterilization law. Carrie Buck was a 17 year-old girl who had been
committed to a state institution for the epileptic and feebleminded after giving birth to an illegitimate
daughter. The Virginia law required that institutionalized patients be sterilized for eugenic and
therapeutic reasons as a condition of release. See Cynkar, supra note 11, at 1437-38. Subsequent
historical research has suggested that neither Carrie, her mother, nor Carrie's daughter (who was an
infant at the time of the "diagnosis") were "imbeciles" as characterized by Justice Holmes in his
much quoted proclamation, "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
Indeed, it has been reported that Carrie's daughter was on the second grade honor roll before dying
at age eight. See Lombardo, supra note 2, at 61. It seems probable that the moralistic impulses of
the eugenicists influenced the categorization of this family as feebleminded. See Cynkar, supra note
11, at 52-53. Carrie and her mother both produced children out of wedlock. The testimony of Dr.
Priddy, the director of the institution, also suggests that sterilization was viewed as a way to achieve
social control over the poor: "[Tihese people belong to the shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of
anti-social whites of the South ... [about whom] it is impossible to get intelligent and satisfactory
data ...." Lombardo, supra note 2, at 51-52. See also Cynkar, supra note 1i, at 1439 (discussing
use of sterilization as method for controlling poverty).
This harsh tone may obscure the fact that eugenic policies were not viewed as oppressive in-
fringements on individual rights, but as tools of social reform. Eugenicists attributed most social
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ilization law against constitutional challenge and implicitly accepted the
validity of eugenic theory. Even at that time, however, the scientific
merit of the theory was controversial;' 5 it has since been largely discred-
ited. 16 Reports of widespread sterilization in Nazi Germany led to in-
creased criticism of eugenic sterilization laws. By the 1960's, involuntary
sterilization was frequently characterized as an unjustified intrusion by
the state on individual liberty and privacy.1 7 The reform law that has
problems to heredity; they linked crime, prostitution, and poverty to mental deficiency. Progressives
therefore embraced these policies as state action designed to improve society, arguing that if afflicted
individuals were prevented from reproducing, society's ills would disappear. Justice Holmes was
articulating the accepted liberal view in endorsing the eugenic rationale.
15. See Cynkar, supra note 11, at 1420-35. It appears, though, that Buck's attorney, White-
head, never fully briefed this issue for argument before the Court. It was only in the petition for
rehearing (following a storm of public protest over Holmes's opinion) that Whitehead included the
strongest arguments against the sterilization law-questioning for the first time the "scientific" pro-
positions espoused by eugenic theories. Some have pointed to this sequence of events to support the
allegation that Bell was a "friendly suit." Lombardo, supra note 2, at 57.
16. Researchers in genetics increasingly disassociated themselves from the eugenic movement
as scientific understanding of genetics became more sophisticated in the 1920's and 1930's. In 1936,
the American Neurological Association Committee for the Investigation of Eugenical Sterilization
issued a statement opposing eugenic sterilization and challenging its scientific premises. See Ferster,
supra note 10, at 602-03. In 1937, a committee of the American Medical Association also adopted
this position. Id. at 603. The critical scientific fallacy underlying the sterilization laws is that "con-
ditions such as feeblemindedness lump together cases having no genetic component with those in
which there may be a partial or complete genetic contribution." Moorhead, Views of a Geneticist on
Eugenic Sterilization, in EUGENIC STERILIZATION, supra note 2, at 115. For an interesting history
of the eugenics movement, see Kevles, The Annals of Eugenics, NEW YORKER, Oct. 8, 1984, at 51;
Oct. 15, 1984, at 52; Oct. 22, 1984, at 92; Oct. 29, 1984, at 51.
This is not to say that intelligence does not have a hereditary component. Most modern experts
agree that genetic factors significantly influence intelligence and that there is, in general, a relation-
ship between children's and parents' intelligence. Scarr-Salapatek, Genetics and the Development of
Intelligence, 4 CHILD DEV. RES. 1 (1975). Psychological studies indicate that both heredity and
environment can influence intelligence. The most impressive evidence for some genetic determina-
tion of intelligence comes from studies of adopted children. Professor Munzinger critically evalu-
ated studies of adopted children and found that five studies (involving 351 families) showed that the
average correlation between the parents' and their adopted children's IQs was 0.19. B. MARTIN,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 567 (1977). He found a significantly greater correlation between the in-
telligence level of the same children and their biological parents. Id
17. The development of the doctrine of reproductive privacy in the 1960's and 1970's has af-
fected the constitutional analysis of sterilization laws. Since eugenic sterilization laws infringe a
fundamental right, these laws are subject to strict scrutiny rather than the rational-basis review
engaged in by Justice Holmes in Bell. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Virginia statute in Bell probably would
not meet this heightened scrutiny given the dubious validity of eugenic theory. Indeed, several
courts authorizing parens patriae sterilization have assumed that Bell is constitutionally suspect. See
In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 246, 426 A.2d 467, 472
(1981).
Even if the state could establish that involuntary sterilization was necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest, the statute in Bell might fall under the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Supreme Court stated this doctrine as follows: "Even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
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emerged in recent years represents a vehement rejection of the philoso-
phy and policy of the eugenic movement.' 8 It is explicitly designed to
protect the interests of the retarded person rather than those of society.
A second impetus to reform has been the development of the consti-
tutional doctrine of reproductive privacy.' 9 A principal reason why
courts and legislatures have been concerned about protecting the repro-
ductive rights of retarded persons20 is that reproductive rights in general
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose." Id. at 488 (footnote omitted). See generally Hoffmann & Faust,
Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally IlI: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEO L.
REv. 1100 (1977).
Numerous commentators have criticized eugenic sterilization and Justice Holmes's opinion in
Bell from a constitutional perspective. See Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 10, at 954; Zenoff,
Reappraisal of Eugenic Sterilization Laws, 10 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 149, 159-60 (1961); Note,
Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L. 280, 297 (1975).
18. Twenty-eight eugenic sterilization statutes were reported in 1956. See O'Hara & Sanks,
Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20,42 (1956). Many of these have been repealed since the 1960's.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (West Supp. 1972) (repealed 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34, § 2462 (1978) (repealed 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 341 (West 1979) (repealed
1983). Today only a few states have police-power sterilization laws. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-
1 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-47-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); W. VA.
CODE § 27-16-1 (1980).
19. A series of Supreme Court opinions beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (striking down law banning use of contraceptives), developed the modem doctrine of
reproductive privacy. Several decisions have struck down restrictions on the use and sale of contra-
ceptives and on a woman's right to choose abortion. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2182 (1986) (women have constitutionally protected
right to abortion; state regulation may not intimidate women into continuing pregnancies); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (city cannot impose
restrictive requirements on abortion or determine that all minors under age 15 are too immature to
make abortion decision); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion) (mature
minors have right to make abortion decisions without parental consent); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (law prohibiting sale of contraceptives to anyone under age 16 re-
stricts reproductive privacy); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1976) (states
cannot give husband or parents veto over wife's or daughter's abortion decision by requiring con-
sent); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66 (women have right to terminate pregnancy through abortion until
viability); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973) (requirement that abortions be performed in
hospitals and approved by a hospital committee unduly restricts reproductive privacy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (making contraceptives unavailable to single women infringes repro-
ductive privacy).
Aside from the uncertain scientific basis of eugenic theories, there has been a vehement rejection
on ethical grounds of the policy that less intelligent members of society should not be allowed to
reproduce.
20. The judicial opinions dealing with parens patriae sterilization repeatedly emphasize the im-
portance of protecting the retarded person's constitutional right of reproductive privacy. See Con-
servatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 161, 707 P.2d 760, 772, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 399 (1985)
(incompetent women have procreative choice that is recognized as fundamental right); see also In re
Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 563-64, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (1982) (decision to bear child at heart of constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy); Grady, 85 N.J. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474 (inability to make repro-
ductive decisions should not result in forfeiture of constitutional right); In re Guardianship of Hayes,
93 Wash. 2d 228, 234, 608 P.2d 635, 639 (1980) (sterilization implicates right to privacy and funda-
mental right to procreate).
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have been accorded a special status in recent years. The right of normal
adults and mature minors2 to avoid unwanted pregnancy through abor-
tion, contraception, and (for adults) sterilization 22 is well established.
The right to procreate, in contrast, has received little attention, probably
because it has seldom been challenged.2 3 The development of the doc-
trine of reproductive privacy casts substantial doubt on the continued
validity of involuntary sterilization laws like the one upheld in Buck v.
Bell. 24 There is general consensus that mentally disabled persons should,
to the extent that their disability allows, enjoy the same right of repro-
ductive privacy as normal people.25
21. See supra note 19.
22. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the right of normal adults to obtain
sterilization. Lower courts, however, have expanded the right of reproductive privacy to include the
right to obtain sterilization. See Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir.
1973) (hospital policy banning sterilization violates equal protection clause because surgical proce-
dures of equal risk are permitted); Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 55, 342 A.2d 574, 577 (1975)
(married woman has constitutional right to obtain sterilization without husband's consent).
Normal minors are generally not permitted to obtain sterilization. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT.
§ 27-10.5-128(1) (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8705(a) (Supp. 1986). The enormous cost of error
justifies some restriction on reproductive autonomy. Unlike abortion and contraception, the minor
can postpone the sterilization decision with minimal cost.
23. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
birth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983). Professor Robertson provides a comprehensive analysis of
the right to procreate in the context of modem reproductive technology. He defines three dimen-
sions of the right-conception, gestation and birth, and rearing.
The only Supreme Court decision that specifically affirms the right to procreate is Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court did not analyze the substance of the
right but described it as essential to the "survival of the race." Id. at 541.
24. Nonetheless, constitutional analysis of the reform law is complicated by two factors. The
application of the doctrine of reproductive privacy to persons with questionable capacity for autono-
mous decisionmaking is unclear to the extent that the right of reproductive privacy is the right to
control reproductive decisions. Furthermore, unlike eugenic law, the reform law is designed to pro-
mote the mentally retarded person's interest (by making the option of sterilization available); it is not
inherently an infringement by the state on a fundamental right. As noted above, the right to choose
sterilization is itself constitutionally protected. See supra note 22. Thus the application of strict
scrutiny is unclear.
25. Reform advocates tend to define the retarded person's interest in reproductive privacy
solely in terms of the right to procreate. In Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 90 (1983), a severely retarded woman became pregnant and had a child. She sued her
conservator for negligence in failing to prevent the pregnancy and birth through contraception or
abortion. The court rejected the claim on the ground that her conservator would have interfered
with her right of reproductive privacy by taking such measures. Id at 9, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
Many courts that have examined sterilization laws have likewise emphasized the disabled wo-
man's fundamental right to procreate. See In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 267, 304 S.E.2d 793,
799 (1983) ("[S]terilization not only affects the individual's fundamental right to procreate.... it
forever deprives the individual of that basic liberty."). In Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d
143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985), Chief Justice Bird, dissenting, argued to uphold Cali-
fornia's statutory ban on the sterilization of individuals under a conservatorship on the grounds of
the right to procreate. Id., at 183, 707 P.2d at 788, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
Bird argued that the mentally disabled person does not have the right to be sterilized because that
right is premised on the ability to make a decision. Id. According to Bird, the mentally disabled
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The view that the mentally retarded person should exercise her
rights to the fullest extent possible reflects a changing conception of
mental retardation. A cognitive developmental approach has to some
extent supplanted the medical model of mental retardation that empha-
sizes unalterable organic brain pathology. 26 With the application of cog-
nitive developmental theory to the functioning of mentally retarded
persons, there has been a corresponding appreciation that the designation
"mentally retarded" applies to individuals who exhibit a broad range of
deficiencies. 27
person does have an unrestricted right to procreate, because she has the right to retain "the biologi-
cal capabilities with which... she was born into this world." Id. at 181, 707 P.2d at 786, 219 Cal.
Rptr. at 413. See generally Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action and the Concept of Consent, 1 L.
& PSYCHOLOGY REV. 57, 63-65 (1975) (characterizing third-party consent to sterilization as a depri-
vation of the individual's rights).
Some laws assume that the retarded person's interest in reproductive choice is like that of the
normal person, and that the law's role is to remove the barrier created by her disability. The New
Jersey Supreme Court articulated this view: "Lee Ann does not have the ability to make a choice
between sterilization and procreation .... But her inability should not result in the forfeit of this
constitutional interest .... [T]he decision . . . 'should not be discarded solely on the basis that her
condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.'" In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250, 426 A.2d
467, 474 (1981) (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976)).
26. See E. SCHULMAN, FOCUS ON THE RETARDED ADULT: PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 34-94
(1980). Schulman traces the historical development of conceptions of mental disability and corre-
sponding public policy responses. The medical model of retardation dominated in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. This model described and classified several organic causes of
retardation including brain injury and chromosomal and genetic abnormalities such as Down's Syn-
drome, Tay Sachs disease, microcephaly, and hydrocephaly. The medical approach is useful in un-
derstanding severe retardation; persons with Wechsler IQs below 39 are almost always in the
organically impaired category. See R. MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, MENTAL RETARDATION AND
STERILIZATION 13-14 (1981). But organic pathology does not explain the causes of disability in
most mildly retarded persons; only 25% of mildly retarded persons are organically impaired. The
remaining 75% may simply be comprised of individuals whose intelligence level is at the lower end
of a continuum. See E. SCHULMAN, supra, at 55. But see B. MARTIN, supra note 16, at 570-74
(describing the extent to which mild retardation has organic causes).
Professor Zigler and others developed the cognitive developmental approach that applies
Piaget's theories to the functioning of mentally retarded persons. See Zigler, Mental Retardation:
Current Issues and Approaches, 2 REV. CHILD DEV. RES. 107, 111-13 (1966). Piaget postulated that
human intelligence developed in a series of adaptive stages occurring in childhood and adolescence.
See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY 57 (3d ed. 1981). Disabled persons progress through the developmental stages at a slower rate
than normal children and fail to attain the higher developmental stages. The stage of cognitive
development attained correlates with the level of mental retardation. See id. at 852.
27. A retarded person is classified by comparing her behavior to a particular age group's behav-
ior using factors such as academic skill, social responsiveness, responsibility, and vocational per-
formance. The classification may change as the retarded person develops or as society's expectations
change. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at 853. Four commonly used classifications
of mental retardation have been recognized by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders. See id. at 851. These classifications are based on the
Weschler Intelligence Quotient of the affected person. The four classifications are:
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Custodial programs that segregate and warehouse retarded persons
are no longer endorsed by professionals. Today, programs for mentally
retarded persons pursue the goal of "normalization'-the development
of skills that enable the individual to live as independently and self-suffi-
ciently as possible.28 Issues of sexual autonomy are an important aspect
(1) Mild-IQ 51 to 70. Mildly retarded individuals can usually master basic academic skills.
Adults are capable of living independently or semi-independently in the community. See id. at 852.
Mildly retarded persons may need slight assistance such as health care reminders or help in purchas-
ing clothes. They are coordinated, can navigate their neighborhood, can communicate and under-
stand complex verbal concepts, and can perform semi-skilled or low skill jobs. See H. GROSSMAN,
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION (1983). Mildly retarded individuals handle sexual im-
pulses and urges normally and can develop appropriate adaptive skills through education. See R.
MONAT, SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED 6 (1982).
(2) Moderate-IQ 36 to 50. Many individuals functioning at this level can learn self-help,
communication, social, and simple occupational skills, but only limited academic or vocational
skills. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at 852. Moderately retarded persons perform
personal hygiene tasks, possess gross and fine motor coordination, use complex sentences, and read
simple prose material; they may initiate activities and conscientiously perform simple household
tasks. See id. Moderately retarded persons can learn sexual responsibility, but self-experimentation
is common. See R. MONAT, supra, at 15.
(3) Severe-IQ 20 to 35. Severely retarded persons require continuing and close supervision,
but may perform self-help and simple work tasks. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at
851-52. They can usually prepare simple foods and perform uncomplicated household tasks. Se-
verely retarded persons may use sentences and understand verbal communication, but they profit
most from systematic habit training. See id. They do not control sexual impulses well but condi-
tioning can alter their behavior to some extent. There is a limited ability to predict or foresee the
consequences of their sexual behavior. See R. MONAT, supra, at 3-4.
(4) Profound-IQ 0 to 20. Profoundly retarded persons require continuing and close supervi-
sion, but some may be able to perform simple self-help tasks. They often have handicaps and require
total life-support systems. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at 851-52. Profoundly
retarded persons do not perform all personal hygiene tasks and generally use only simple language.
See id. Their sexual reactions are predominantly impulsive, they cannot easily engage in sexual
activity on a reciprocal level, and they often masturbate in a harmful or excessive way. See R.
MONAT, supra, at 4, 24-25.
28. Professor Nine is the leading proponent of normalization. He defined the concept as "mak-
ing available to the mentally subnormal patterns and conditions of everyday life which are as close as
possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society." Nije, Symposium on "Normaliza-
tion'" The Normalization Principle-Implications and Comments, 16 BRIT. J. MENTAL SUBNOR-
MALITY 62, 62 (1970). See also Wolfensburger, The Principle of Normalization and Its Implication to
Psychiatric Services, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 291, 291-97 (1970). Normalization has become the
primary objective of programs for the retarded.
The two central components of normalization are deinstitutionalization and educational main-
streaming. Experts generally agree that mentally retarded persons attain fuller development in com-
munity settings rather than in institutions. Retarded children develop better when they live with
their families and are reared by their parents. Adults may also thrive in a well-functioning family;
however, a residence for retarded adults may alternatively provide companionship and support. See
E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 256-83.
The normalization approach also emphasizes educational mainstreaming. The federal law deal-
ing with the education of handicapped individuals supports this normalization principle. See 20
U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1982) (state must provide "procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent
appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not handicapped").
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of the normalization trend;29 freedom and privacy in social and sexual
relationships may be as important to mentally disabled persons as to
others. Furthermore, marriage and parenthood are realistic options for
some mildly disabled persons who, with appropriate training, may be ca-
pable of fulfilling those roles.30 Sterilization is viewed as rarely desirable
because many mentally retarded persons are presumed to have at least a
potential interest in having children.
Many mildly retarded persons have been "mainstreamed" into regular classrooms. See E. SCHUL-
MAN, supra note 26, at 65.
Implicit in the concept of normalization is the notion that mentally retarded persons should
enjoy the same legal rights as others to the extent that they are able to do so. In an official statement
in 1973, the American Academy of Mental Deficiency emphasized that "[m]entally retarded citizens
are entitled to enjoy and exercise the same rights as are available to nonretarded citizens, to the
limits of their ability to do so." Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons: An Official Statement of the
American Academy of Mental Deficiency, MENTAL RETARDATION, Oct. 1973, at 56, 56-57. See also
Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDA-
TION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 3 (1976).
Some commentators argue that zealous commitment to the principle of normalization in educa-
tion may not help seriously impaired persons because the quality of the individual's educational
experience depends on factors other than physical placement. See, e.g., Vitello, Cautions on the
Road to Normalization, MENTAL RETARDATION, Oct. 1974, at 39, 40.
29. The notion that mentally disabled persons are sexual beings is only recently gaining accept-
ance among professionals who work with this population. In the past, dealing with sexual behavior
was viewed as a "problem"; usually, preventing sexual contact among residents or participants in
programs/placements for mentally retarded persons was standard policy. Mentally retarded persons
have traditionally been deemed incapable of controlling sexual impulses, a view that is clearly erro-
neous as applied to mildly retarded persons. See E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 298. Today, as
part of the normalization trend, sex education is an important part of programs for mentally re-
tarded persons. Helping the individual deal with sexual issues in a positive and socially appropriate
manner has become the objective of many programs. See S. HAARIK & K. MENNINGER, SEXUAL-
ITY, LAW, AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON 151 (1981); R. MONAT, supra note
27, at 46-49; E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 292-312.
30. Historically, many states have statutorily prohibited or restricted marriage by mentally re-
tarded persons. See Note, The Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: A Statutory Evaluation, 15
J. FAM. L. 463, 487-507 (1977). States have begun to repeal these statutes because of a growing
awareness that some mentally retarded persons may successfully marry and rear children. See Sha-
man, Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAM. L.Q.
61, 84 (1978); Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect Proceedings: The Erroneous Assumption of Parental
Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV. 785, 804 (1979).
Mental retardation professionals generally support normalization; however, many are still con-
cerned about the capability of mentally retarded persons to be parents. Indeed, one goal among
professionals has been to promote normal relationships that are not burdened by the possibility of
pregnancy. See E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 301-03. There is growing recognition, however,
that some mentally disabled persons can function as parents. See Rosenberg & McTate, Intellectu-
ally Handicapped Mothers: Problems and Perspectives, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 24.
Authorities seem to require that mentally retarded parents provide a higher standard of care than
that generally expected of normal parents. See Murphy, Coleman & Abel, Human Sexuality it the
Mentally Retarded, in TREATMENT ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN MENTAL RETARDATION 614 (J.
Matson & F. Andrasik eds. 1983). Recently there has been a focus on supportive services and train-
ing in parenting skills for mentally retarded persons. See Madsen, Parenting Classes for the Mentally
Retarded, 17 MENTAL RETARDATION 195, 195 (1979); Rosenberg & McTate, supra, at 24.
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B. Current Sterilization Law.
The preceding factors have stimulated the reform of sterilization law
in recent years. A few jurisdictions have banned sterilization of incompe-
tent persons altogether.31 Under most reform laws, however, the state
may authorize sterilization under its parens patriae authority if certain
conditions are met. 32 Many of these laws follow a model derived from a
Washington Supreme Court case, In re Guardianship of Hayes.33 Hayes
requires a two-part inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the
individual is competent to make an informed medical decision about ster-
ilization.34 This inquiry seeks to protect the autonomy interest of the
31. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-128(2) (Supp. 1985) ("No person with developmental dis-
abilities who has not given consent shall be sterilized."). In 1981, the Colorado Supreme Court
carved out an exception to allow sterilization of mentally retarded minors. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d
366, 375 (Colo. 1981). A California law prohibiting sterilization of all persons under conservator-
ship, CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356 (1981), was struck down in 1985 in Conservatorship of Valerie N.,
40 Cal. 3d 143, 160-61, 707 P.2d 760, 771-72, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398-99 (1985). Several courts have
effectively banned sterilization by refusing to allow sterilization in the absence of statutory authority.
See infra note 32. Federal law prohibits government funding of the sterilization of minors and
incompetents. See ReIf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1974) (Secretary of HEW
has no authority to fund sterilization of minors or mentally incompetent persons who are incompe-
tent to consent to the operation); 42 C.F.R. § 50.207 (1985) (prohibiting federally assisted family-
planning projects from funding hysterectomies performed solely for the purpose of sterilization).
32. During the 1960's and 1970's, many states repealed eugenic sterilization laws, often without
making alternative provisions for sterilization of incompetents. Courts generally rejected petitions to
obtain sterilization of mentally retarded persons because of the absence of statutory authority. See
Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671, 673-74 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d
310, 312 (Ala. 1979); Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 761-62, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66-67
(1974); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, 638, 325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1975), cerL denied, 425 U.S.
936 (1976); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d
467, 470 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). But see In re
Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297-98, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Simpson, 180
N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that judicial immunity protected an Indiana
judge who had authorized the sterilization of a young woman in the absence of statutory authority.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Immunity applied because the judge's decision was
not in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction," although the judge may have erred or exceeded his
authority. Id. at 356-57.
Although Stump does not directly affirm judicial authority, it opened the path for a series of
decisions recognizing the parens patriae power to order the sterilization of mentally disabled persons
in the absence of statutory authority.
Several states have enacted statutory provisions that sanction parens patriae sterilization of
incompetents. See statutes cited supra note 3. Most recent laws are grounded in the state's parens
patriae authority; earlier laws, in contrast, were usually based on the police power.
33. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
34. The Hayes court explained that:
[T]he judge must first find by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the individual is
(1) incapable of making his or her own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to
develop sufficiently to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable
future.
Id. at 238, 608 P.2d at 641.
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competent person who has no need for a surrogate decisionmaker. 35 If
the court determines that the person is incompetent, it must then con-
sider specific factors and decide whether sterilization is in the person's
best interest.36
Most laws following the Hayes decision embody strict procedural
and substantive requirements that create a strong presumption against
sterilization. These laws presume that there is a conflict of interest be-
tween the child and the parent in this context and consequently exclude
parents from any role in the decision. 37 A court makes the sterilization
decision in a formal "semi-adversarial" proceeding.3 8 The retarded indi-
35. Some states folow Hayes and require a threshold determination of the person's competency
to make the sterilization decision before considering whether nonconsensual sterilization is appropri-
ate. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
293 Md. 685, 702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re Moe, 385
Mass. 555, 566, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 483
(1981); In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 565, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 27-10.5-130 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-788 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-B, § 7005 (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.225(3) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-2
(1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8707 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.9 (1982). Although
many laws state that the first determination is incompetency, only a few clearly stop the inquiry if
competency is found. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78W (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-B, § 7008 (1986). A few states permit sterilization on a general finding of incompetency. See
In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 271, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980) ("The court must [find] that the ward
is 'incapacitated'.. . and suffers a 'developmental disability'.....); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252
A.11-13 (West 1982) (conservatee may be sterilized upon best interest finding).
36. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 237, 608 P.2d at 640.
37. The parent's petition generally triggers the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the child's interests. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475 (incompetents are best protected by
independent judicial decisionmaking, not parents' good faith decision); Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 236,
608 P.2d at 640 (parents' interests cannot be presumed to be identical to those of child).
Some laws characterize the court's role as deciding whether to authorize the parent/guardian to
consent to sterilization; however, this does not signify any abdication to parental decisionmaking
authority in terms of relaxed procedural or substantive standards. See, e.g., Wenizel, 293 Md. at
701, 447 A.2d at 1254 (guardian's decision authorized only if sterilization is medically necessary).
38. See C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 612 (procedural due process requires full judicial hearing with
medical testimony and guardian ad litem to represent incompetent); Grady, 85 N.J. at 252, 426 A.2d
at 475 (independent judicial decisionmaking best protects interests of incompetents). Most laws
specify a range of procedural protections such as representation by counsel and expert evaluation of
the retarded person. See Wenizel, 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253 (independent medical, psycho-
logical, and social evaluations by competent professionals); Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238, 608 P.2d at
641 (comprehensive medical, psychological, and social evaluation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-5-
130(1) (Supp. 1985) (appointment of two mental health professionals to perform evaluations); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78t (West 1981) (appointment of counsel); IDAHO CODE § 39-3903(a),(d)
(1985) (appointment of two physicians); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7008.2 (Supp. 1986)
(appointment of not less than two disinterested mental health experts); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 252A.13.4 (West 1982) (appointment of counsel and written medical, social, and psychological
evaluations); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(2) (1986) (appointment of counsel); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 8710 (Supp. 1986) (appointment of counsel); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.12.B (1982) (independ-
ent medical, social, and psychological evaluations).
Some laws accord other procedural protections such as notice of the proceedings, the right to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to pursue an appeal. See Moe, 385 Mass. at 566-67, 432
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vidual is represented by an attorney, usually a guardian ad litem, who
may be directed to oppose the parents' petition for sterilization.39 Most
of the reform laws allow a court to order sterilization only upon findings
based on clear and convincing evidence. 4
In addition to procedural restrictions, these laws employ rigorous
substantive criteria to guide the court's deliberations. Some require in-
quiries into whether the individual is able to reproduce41 and whether she
N.E.2d at 721 (adequate notice, opportunity to be heard, and pursuit of appeal); Grady, 85 N.J. at
264, 426 A.2d at 482 (appointment of guardian ad litem and opportunity to present proofs and cross-
examine); Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 565, 450 A.2d at 1383 (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-
129(2), (3) (1982) (notice, presence at proceeding, and opportunity to cross-examine); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-78s to 78y(a) (West Supp. 1986) (notice, opportunity to testify and cross-ex-
amine); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7007.3, 7008.1 (Supp. 1986) (opportunity to present
evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.255(2), 436.275(2), 436.315
(1983) (appointment of counsel on appeal and opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8709(c), 8711, 8714 (Supp. 1986) (notice and right to appeal);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.11.2 (1982) (notice of proceedings and appointment of counsel).
39. See, eg., Moe, 385 Mass. at 567, 432 N.E.2d at 721.
40. In In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 373-75 (Colo. 1981), the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-312 (Supp. 1986) to allow court-ordered sterilization upon a showing of
clear and convincing evidence. The law of Maine specifically requires "clear and convincing evi-
dence that sterilization is in the best interest of the person being considered for sterilization." ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7013(4) (Supp. 1986). In Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983), the Maryland Supreme
Court held that section 13-702 of the Maryland Estates and Trusts Code empowered the court to
adopt standards that would ensure the ward's best interest regarding proposed sterilization. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that under a statute mandating court approval of guardian-
requested sterilization, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25I(e) (1983), the guardian must present
clear and convincing proof that the ward is incapacitated, and that the guardian is acting in the best
interest of the ward. In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 271-72, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980). The propo-
nent of a sterilization in New Jersey must show by clear and convincing evidence that the person to
be sterilized lacks the capacity to consent or withhold consent. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d
at 483. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court required "proof by clear and convincing evidence that
sterilization is in the best interest of the incompetent." Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 564, 450 A.2d
at 1382. Virginia statutory law requires a court to determine "by clear and convincing evidence"
that a child is incapable of making a decision before that court can order sterilization. VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-325.10 (1982). In order for any incompetent in Virginia to be sterilized, the statutory
elements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.12 (1982).
The Washington Supreme Court stated that the requirements for a court-ordered sterilization must
be proven by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at
641.
41. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska 1981) ("[I]t must then be established that the
incompetent is capable of reproduction .... "); Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 566, 450 A.2d at 1383
("[T]he person for whom sterilization is requested must be proven capable of reproduction.");
Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238, 608 P.2d at 641 ("The judge must find that the individual is... physi-
cally capable of conceiving .... ); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d) (West Supp. 1986) ("no
evidence of infertility"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7011 (West Supp. 1986) (petition for
sterilization must include a "medical statement assessing the physiological capability of the person to
procreate"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 635-39 (1984) (petition for involuntary sterilization must state
whether patient is likely to procreate).
Some courts seem to presume reproductive capacity from the existence of regular monthly peri-
ods and the absence of contrary medical evidence. See Grady. 85 N.J. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483; In re
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is "imminently" likely to engage in sexual activity. 42 The petitioner will
be asked to demonstrate that less drastic forms of contraception have
been tried and are not feasible.43 The court must also assess the individ-
ual's capacity to care for a child.44 Some states require a determination
that sterilization is medically essential to preserve the life or the physical
or mental health of the individual.45 In some states, the court must also
inquire into the disabled person's understanding of reproductive func-
tions and the relationship between sexual intercourse, pregnancy, and
childbirth.46 Some laws direct the court to consider the psychological
trauma associated with sterilization and alternatively with pregnancy
Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 283, 304 S.E.2d 793, 808 (1983), aff'd as modified, 313 N.C. 421, 329
S.E.2d 630 (1985). Other courts require further affirmative medical proof. See In re Debra B., 495
A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985) (mother's sterilization petition denied because she failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to prove that 26 year-old daughter was capable of procreation). Such re-
quirements may involve an intrusive medical examination to prove reproductive capacity (or post-
poning the sterilization initiative until the person has become pregnant).
42. See Moe, 385 Mass. at 570, 432 N.E.2d at 722; Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 567, 450 A.2d
at 1384; Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238, 608 P.2d at 641; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(4) (West
Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(1)(d) (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8711(c)(3)(B)
(Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.12.A.1 (1982). But see Grady, 85 N.J. at 266, 426 A.2d at
483 (no need to show likelihood of pregnancy).
43. Many laws require that all less drastic (nonpermanent) contraceptive methods be unwork-
able and that there be no alternative to sterilization. See C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 613; In re A.W., 637
P.2d 366, 376 (Colo. 1981); Moe, 385 Mass. at 569, 432 N.E.2d at 722; Grady, 85 N.J. at 266, 426
A.2d at 483; Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 237, 608 P.2d at 640; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3(c)(2) (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§7013(5)(a) (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. §252A.13.4 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 8711(a)(3)(E) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 54-325.12.A.2 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 27-16-1 (1980).
44. See CD.M., 627 P.2d at 613; Moe, 385 Mass. at 569, 432 N.E.2d at 722; Grady, 85 N.J. at
266, 426 A.2d at 483; Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 567, 450 A.2d at 1384; Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at
238, 608 P.2d at 641; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(6) (West Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 436.205(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 871 1(c)(3)(C) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.12.A.4 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 27-16-1(3) (1980).
45. See A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; Moe, 385 Mass. at 569 n.10, 432 N.E.2d at 722 n.10; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p(d)(8) (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7013.5
(Supp. 1984). Colorado requires this finding to protect the individual's health and "fundamental
procreative rights." A. W., 637 P.2d at 376. Courts in Maryland must make a finding of medical
necessity and also determine whether sterilization is in the individual's best interest. See Wentzel V.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253-54 (1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1147 (1983).
In Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 169, 707 P.2d 760, 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387,
404 (1985), the California Supreme Court seemed to require medical necessity because of the absence
of a statute. The court directed, pending legislative action, that the procedures for approving intru-
sive medical procedures for conservatees be applied to sterilization.
In general, the "medical necessity" requirement treats sterilization like other medical proce-
dures for incompetents. However, sterilization is also a reproductive option which normal persons
choose for reasons other than health promotion. The New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected a
required showing of "medical necessity" as too restrictive of the rights of the retarded person. See
Grady. 85 N.J. at 262-63, 426 A.2d at 481.
46. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483; Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 567, 450 A.2d at
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and childbirth. 47 Additionally, an inquiry into the individual's prefer-
ences about sterilization may be required, although her objection is not
determinative.48 The Hayes decision and some later laws require findings
that medical science is not on the verge of breakthroughs that will cor-
rect the individual's disability or make reversible sterilization available.4 9
These various criteria create formidable substantive barriers to the sterili-
zation of mentally retarded persons.5 0
Current law explicitly or implicitly excludes some variables from the
court's consideration, such as the state's interest in protecting society
from the genetic and financial burden of children produced by retarded
persons.51 The parents' interest in protecting their child from unwanted
47. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483; Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 567, 450 A.2d at
1384; Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641-42; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7013.3.B
(Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.205(1) (1985).
48. Several laws specify that the retarded person has a right to be present at the hearing and
further direct the court to inquire about the person's wishes and gain impressions about her compe-
tency. See CD.M., 627 P.2d at 613 n.17 (weight given the individual's preferences varies according
to ability to comprehend); A. W., 637 P.2d at 375 (person's wish not to be sterilized weighs heavily
against authorizing the procedure); Wentzel, 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253 (court must allow
full opportunity for individual to express views); Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482 (same);
Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 565-66, 450 A.2d at 1383 (judge must meet with individual, but not
necessarily at hearing); Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238, 608 P.2d at 641 (court must elicit individual's
views before ordering sterilization); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 7011.9 (Supp. 1986) (court
must consider the person's attitudes or desires regarding sterilization before sanctioning the proce-
dure); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(3) (1986) (record must include the person's views on issue of
sterilization); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.11.5 (1982) (court must elicit and thoroughly consider the
child's views on sterilization).
49. See Moe, 385 Mass. at 570, 432 N.E.2d at 722; Grady, 85 N.J. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483;
Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 567, 450 A.2d at 1384; IDAHO CODE § 39-3901(e) (1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-10-8(1)(a) (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8711 (c)(3)(D) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-325.11.4 (1982).
50. Indeed, this is the intention. Several courts state clearly that sterilization of an incompetent
is seldom in her best interest. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has stated that there is a
"heavy presumption against sterilization ... that must be overcome by the person ... requesting
sterilization." Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 239, 608 P.2d at 641. See also C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 612
(advocates of sterilization bear heavy burden of proving that sterilization is in the incompetent's best
interest).
It is interesting to note the similarity between the procedural and substantive requirements of
the recent parens patriae laws and the remaining police-power laws. Compare statutes cited supra
note 3 with GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3(a) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-3901(a) (1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 35-39(3) (1984).
The police-power laws require these protections because sterilization is viewed as a deprivation
of the fundamental right to procreate. It is clear that parens patriae laws are grounded in the same
notion. Thus, despite rhetoric about the exercise of reproductive choice, see Grady, 85 N.J. at 247-
51, 426 A.2d at 473-74, reform laws treat sterilization as an infringement on the person's rights just
as do the police-power laws.
51. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 262 n.8, 426 A.2d at 481 n.8 (court should consider "only the best
interests of the incompetent person, not the interests or convenience of society"). Grady rejected the
use of sterilization to promote genetic objectives or to prevent the birth of children who would be a
burden to society. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that sterilization is to be allowed only if
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pregnancy or in avoiding the inconvenience associated with menstrual
hygiene is also excluded from consideration. 52 Finally, the disabled indi-
vidual's interest in promoting family stability by reducing the stress asso-
ciated with her care may not be considered.
The substantive criteria that guide the decisionmaker are formulated
into four kinds of legal rules. The Hayes opinion adopts the most com-
mon approach, which could be termed a "mandatory criteria" rule;
under this type of rule a court can authorize sterilization only if several
specific findings are clearly made.53 This rule places a significant burden
on the petitioner, limits judicial discretion, and makes it difficult to estab-
lish the desirability of sterilization. The "discretionary best interest"
standard is a more flexible rule; instead of requiring specific findings, it
directs judges to consider and weigh designated criteria in determining
whether sterilization is in the incompetent person's best interest.5 4 A few
"medically essential" and has emphasized that only the interests of the person herself, and not those
of society or her parents, are to be considered. A. W., 637 P.2d at 376. See also Terwilliger, 304 Pa.
Super. at 564, 450 A.2d at 1382 ("[A] court should consider only the interests of the individual
52. Some laws require parents to demonstrate their good faith and concern for their child's best
interest. See GD.M., 627 P.2d at 613 (court must examine motivation behind petition); Wentzel,
293 Md. at 704-05, 447 A.2d at 1254 ("[IThe welfare of society or the convenience or peace of mind
of the ward's parents or guardian plays no part."); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 271, 414 A.2d 541,
543 (1980) ("["]he court must be satisfied that... the applicants have demonstrated their good faith
and that their concern is for the best interests of the ward."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-
78p(d)(7) (West Supp. 1986) (applicants' "primary concern" must be best interest of the
incompetent).
53. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641. This kind of law in effect restricts the
discretion of the judge; the legislature or appellate court designating the criteria determines the
sterilization decision. As a legal decision principle, it may be easier to apply than the discretionary
best interest standard, see infra note 54, because it incorporates fewer factual variables. However,
the rule as applied may not result in decisions that benefit the individual for whom sterilization is
proposed. Thus, costs of error are high. The analysis in Parts II and III of this article suggests that
this kind of rule may offer the greatest risk of error. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic
Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267-71 (1974) (discussing correlation of costs
to variations in precision of legal rules). For an analysis of variations in types of decision principles
in child custody law, see Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984).
54. See Penny N., 120 N.H. at 271, 414 A.2d at 543; Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. at 564-67, 450
A.2d at 1383-84; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78y(b) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
§ 252A.13.4 (1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.305(l) (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8712(c) (Supp.
1986).
Even under the discretionary best interest standard, most laws require the court to make a
finding of whether the individual is competent to make the sterilization decision. If the individual is
incompetent, these laws require the court to consider several substantive criteria and decide whether
there is clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in the person's best interest. Error under
this standard may occur if the court fails accurately to weigh the various criteria in the decision.
Maryland requires a finding of medical necessity but also directs the court to weigh several factors in
determining whether sterilization is in the person's best interest. Wentzel. 293 Md. at 702-03, 447
A.2d at 1253-54. Thus, a finding that sterilization is in the person's best interest would not suffice:
sterilization must also be a medical necessity. The requirement of a best-interest finding seems su-
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states have adopted the "substituted judgment" approach first proposed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Grady. 55 Grady directs the
court to consider the Hayes criteria and any other relevant factors in
order to make the decision that the disabled person would make for her-
self if she were competent. 56 Finally, a few jurisdictions simply prohibit
the sterilization of anyone found by the court to be incompetent to give
informed consent to the medical procedureP 7
On a functional level, the various legal rules seem to promote differ-
ent objectives. A rule prohibiting sterilization without the subject's in-
formed consent apparently aims to protect only the right to procreate.
Sterilization is by definition a violation of this right, regardless of the
person's preferences. At the other extreme, the substituted judgment
standard attempts, at least in theory, to approximate the choice that the
perfluous, since a procedure that is medically necessary would arguably always be in the person's
best interest.
55. 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
56. Id. at 264-67, 426 A.2d at 482-83. See also In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565-71, 432 N.E.2d
712, 720-23 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-8(4) (1986). The substituted judgment doctrine has
frequently been used in cases involving medical decisions for individuals who have become incompe-
tent. Many of these decisions involve attempts to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from terminally
ill patients. The landmark case is In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a 21 year-old woman in a persistent vegetative
state had a right, which her father as her appointed guardian could exercise on her behalf, to with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The objective of the substituted
judgment approach is for the decisionmaker to "step into the shoes" of the incompetent in order to
make a decision that subjectively reflects what the individual's values and preferences would be were
she competent. Id. In theory, the decision may reflect subjective idiosyncratic values and need not
be the one that objectively reflects the person's best interest.
Courts have applied the substituted judgment approach in cases involving individuals who have
never been competent. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
750-51, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977) (chemotherapy withheld from profoundly retarded 67 year-old
man). The application of the substituted judgment approach is problematic because it requires the
surrogate decisionmaker to discern the competent values and preferences of a never-competent
person.
By establishing objective criteria to aid in approximating the disabled person's best interest, the
cases applying the substituted judgment approach implicitly recognize the pitfalls of a subjective
inquiry. See Grady, 85 N.J. at 266-67, 426 A.2d at 483 (determination based on a range of factors,
including incompetency). In this way, despite the rhetoric, the substituted judgment approach is
similar to the discretionary best interest approach. The Wisconsin Supreme Court accurately char-
acterized the effort to reach the sterilization decision that the incompetent retarded person would
make taking into account anything that would have been relevant to her including her incompetency
as "legal legerdemain." In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881,
893 (1981).
A presidential commission recommended that courts apply an objective best interest standard
to surrogates' decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from persons who had never been
competent, although the commission endorsed the substituted judgment approach for persons who
had once expressed competent preferences. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAl.
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES OF DECISIONMAKING FOR INCAPACITATED PATIENTS 179-88 (1983).
57. See supra note 31.
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individual would make if she were competent. Between these two ex-
tremes are laws that attempt to protect the individual's interest in procre-
ation from parental or state interference.5 8 Despite variation, however,
the reform laws are all based on a paternalism model. The model pro-
tects the mentally disabled person by establishing a heavy presumption
against sterilization and by requiring a judicial decisionmaker.
C. The Limits of Good Intentions: Some Problems with the
Paternalism Model
The rigorously protective approach of the paternalism model may
seem to offer a desirable level of protection when parents propose sterili-
zation. The irreversibility of the medical procedure in itself justifies cau-
tion. Given the abuses of the past and lingering biases toward mentally
retarded persons, a rule that constrains the surrogate decisionmaker by a
strong presumption against sterilization would seem to be justified.
Some retarded persons, however, may be hurt by laws based on the
paternalism model because that model places the interest in procreation
above all other interests, including the interest in avoiding pregnancy.
Like other people, a retarded person may have an interest in engaging in
a sexual relationship without fear of pregnancy. This objective could
often be most satisfactorily implemented through sterilization, but that
option usually will be unavailable under current law. Current law also
unnecessarily restricts the individual's interest in reproductive auton-
omy. Although accorded rhetorical deference, this interest is protected
only if the individual is found to be intellectually capable of making the
medical decision. If the person is found to be incompetent, a court de-
cides whether sterilization is in her best interest. Yet it seems possible
that some persons who may be incapable of informed medical decisions
may be capable of meaningful reproductive choices (to produce a child or
avoid pregnancy). The basis of the restricted conception of individual
autonomy under the paternalism model is unclear. It may derive from a
desire to protect vulnerable individuals from those who threaten their
right to procreate. Alternatively, it may be based on a simplistic analysis
of the mentally disabled person's interest in reproductive autonomy.
58. The case law and commentary discuss two seemingly contradictory objectives of steriliza-
tion law. On the one hand, sterilization is authorized as a means of facilitating reproductive choice.
On the other hand, sterilization is characterized as a deprivation of a fundamental right. See supra
note 20. This characterization is the basis of the general requirement that the criteria supporting
sterilization be established by clear and convincing evidence. Courts cite Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979), which required a clear and convincing standard in civil commitment proceedings
because a deprivation of liberty was involved. This analogy suggests that sterilization is viewed by
some courts as deprivation of procreative capacity rather than a widely used contraceptive option
that could be made available through a surrogate.
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Another problematic aspect of this model is the presumed conflict of
interest in all cases between parent and child. Because every disabled
person is assumed to have an interest in procreation that conflicts with
her parents' effort to obtain sterilization, parental or family interests are
excluded from the decision calculus. This approach may protect the
mildly disabled person who may have an interest in making her own
choices about reproduction. But it could be harmful for the more se-
verely retarded person. Parents who care for a seVerely disabled child
assume a substantial burden. It is not clear that the law serves the inter-
est of such a person by augmenting that burden, especially if the pre-
sumed interest in procreation in fact does not exist. It is also not clear
that a surrogate will be a better decisionmaker than the parents, who
presumably know and love the child.
It is unlikely that sterilization, the contraceptive choice of many
normal persons, is only infrequently desirable for retarded persons. Yet
sterilization will rarely be ordered in many states because most parents
will be unable to meet the rigid criteria set out in the sterilization laws.59
These laws erect obstacles to sterilization in order to protect a possible
interest in procreation, 60 yet they do not grapple directly with the basic
question: How can it be determined whether a given individual has this
interest? In the absence of such an inquiry, it is unclear whether the
purported safeguards serve an actual protective function or whether they
simply burden the petitioning parent and ultimately the affected in-
dividual. 61
II. THE INTERESTS OF THE RETARDED PERSON IN STERILIZATION:
AN AUTONOMY MODEL
This Part develops an alternative approach to sterilization of re-
tarded persons, premised on the primacy of individual and family auton-
omy. First it explores the interest in reproductive autonomy and the
extent to which mental retardation affects the ability to make a meaning-
ful decision to have children or to avoid pregnancy. It then examines the
residual interests that may be important for the severely disabled person
59. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 58.
61. By way of example, consider the blanket requirement that temporary alternatives be tried
and found unworkable. This requirement assumes that the person may have an interest in having
children in the future (and that a nonpermanent form of contraception is therefore desirable) with-
out inquiry into whether or not she actually does. A more extreme example is the rule that autho-
rizes sterilization only if it is a medical necessity. Such a requirement virtually forecloses
sterilization for contraceptive purposes. It presumes that sterilization benefits the individual only if
mandated by critical health needs; otherwise, preserving reproductive capacity is presumed to be of
primary importance.
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who is incapable of autonomous reproductive choice-interests involving
medical risks and benefits, human dignity, and stable family life.
A. Reproductive Autonomy and the Impact of Mental Disability.
Analysis of reproductive autonomy 62 focuses on the individual's
substantive interest in producing children or avoiding pregnancy as well
as on her interest in controlling the decision. It might seem artificial to
examine each interest separately and to distinguish the mentally retarded
person's interest in making her own decisions from the underlying sub-
stantive choices themselves. A retarded person's disability, however, can
differentially affect her interest in alternative outcomes because the deci-
sion to procreate and the decision not to procreate each require different
intellectual capabilities. Furthermore, a person who is unable to make an
autonomous choice about reproduction might nonetheless have an inter-
est in the substance of the decision made by others for her.63 Thus, a
separate analysis of each dimension of the reproductive autonomy inter-
est is indicated.
1. The Interest in Preventing Reproduction. The Supreme Court
decisions that recognize a woman's right to make contraception and
abortion decisions" are based on a right not to procreate. 65 Married in-
dividuals have a legally sanctioned right to cohabit without producing
unwanted children.66 Unmarried persons and minors may not have the
right to engage in sexual activity, but they do have the right to avoid the
62. See infra note 92. Reproductive autonomy is the constitutionally protected interest individ-
uals have in private autonomous decisions about whether or not to have a child. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (fundamental right to choose abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-86 (1965) (fundamental right of marital privacy located in "penumbras" of first, third,
fourth, and ninth amendments). Reproductive privacy is an important aspect of a more general
constitutional right of privacy that extends to decisions about marriage and childrearing, and more
broadly to protection of bodily integrity and avoidance of personal disclosures. In Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court described the right of privacy as encompassing both an
"interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and a distinct interest in "independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 599-60. See generally L. TRIE, AMERICAN
CONsrrIuTioNAL LAW 921-34 (1978) (tracing development of right to privacy in reproduction
decisions).
63. This is also true of many decisions made for children. Children have an interest in the
substantive decisions their parents or the state make concerning their health and safety, even though
they are disabled from making autonomous choices themselves and thus have no recognized auton-
omy interest.
64. See supra note 19.
65. Although the Court has characterized the right of reproductive privacy as the right to
decide whether or not to bear a child, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), Professor
Robertson correctly points out that the interest at stake in abortion and contraceptive cases is the
interest in avoiding conception and childbirth. See Robertson, supra note 23, at 405-06.
66. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965).
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potential costs of sexual intercourse. 67
These costs are varied and substantial. If a woman does not want to
become pregnant or give birth, the pain, discomfort, medical risk, and
lasting physical and emotional effects of the experience are substantial
burdens. For an unmarried female, pregnancy can be an embarrassing
social disability. Responsibility for an unwanted child can entail sub-
stantial financial costs and may limit the social, career, and educational
opportunities available to the parent.
The mentally retarded person may have an interest in avoiding preg-
nancy that is comparable to that of the normal person. She might want
to avoid the costs of sexual freedom-the physical burden of pregnancy
and the discomfort of childbirth. She might also derive a benefit from
avoiding the psychological burden caused by the birth of a child who is
unwanted or for whom she cannot care. The stress of parental responsi-
bility and the negative effect on social, educational, and employment op-
portunities are costs that are as onerous for the retarded individual as for
others.
2. The Interest in Procreation. In defining the constitutional doc-
trine of reproductive privacy, the Supreme Court has seldom focused di-
rectly on the right to procreate. 68 Nonetheless, the importance and
constitutionally protected status of this right are clear. The Court has
described procreation as a "basic civil right of man."' 69 The right is pro-
tected by the constitutional tradition of family privacy and supported by
a strong historical tradition.70 Despite recent concerns about population
67. The Supreme Court has never struck down a state statute proscribing sexual activity be-
tween unmarried persons. However, the Court did strike down a Massachusetts law that limited
access to contraceptives. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977), the Court held that a New York law restricting sale of nonprescription contracep-
tives to minors was unconstitutional. The Court noted, however, that the Constitution "does not bar
state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors." Id. at 694 n. 17. The Court stated in Eisenstadt
that it would be unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended to "prescribe pregnancy as
punishment for fornication." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448. The Court has recently recognized that
protection of sexual privacy outside of marriage may be restricted in nature. In Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), it rejected the challenge of an adult homosexual arrested under a
Georgia antisodomy law for engaging in consensual sexual activity in his home. Id. at 2843. Be-
cause the opinion emphasized the homosexual nature of the activity, its broader application is
unclear.
68. Professor Robertson points out that this right has seldom been subject to state regulation;
for this reason, perhaps, it has seldom been examined and is "ill-defined." See Robertson, supra note
23, at 406.
69. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Skinner struck down,
on equal protection grounds, an Oklahoma law that authorized sterilization of some but not all
habitual criminals.
70. Because of our strong tradition of family privacy, many would reject the notion of state
interference in a couple's freedom to have a child. Other countries have overtly discouraged procre-
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control, the right to procreate remains relatively unambiguous7 '-in con-
trast to the right not to procreate, which in the abortion context is lim-
ited by the interest of the fetus. Indeed, direct restrictions on
reproduction have been tolerated only when applied to mentally disabled
persons through involuntary sterilization laws.
Procreation as a "basic civil right" is closely linked to the doctrine
of family privacy and the right of parents to rear their children. In Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 72 the Supreme Court held that an unmarried natural father
who was rearing his children had a constitutionally protected parental
interest. The Court implicitly linked this parental interest to procreative
rights, stating that "[t]he Court has frequently emphasized the impor-
tance of the family. The rights to conceive and raise one's children have
been deemed 'essential.' -73 Earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 74 the Court
defined the rights "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" 75
as liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment. In contrast, the pa-
rental interest of one who has reproduced without assuming parental re-
sponsibilities is given minimal legal and constitutional recognition. In
Lehr v. Robertson, 76 the Court held that a natural father who had as-
ation in pursuit of policies of population control. The Chinese government offers "one-child"
awards that are available upon sterilization or a promise not to have additional children. These
awards take the form of cash payments and the payment of the child's medical, educational, and
nursery expenses. These "one-child" awards also may take the form of time off from work and
increased pensions. The Chinese government imposes penalties upon parents who have more than
one child and these penalties become more severe as more children are born. See Goodstadt, China's
One-Child Family, 8 POPULATION & DEv. REV. 37, 48 (1982).
71. The reduction in the size of the American family in recent years may be attributed to eco-
nomics and better contraception but not to coercive governmental policies. See Mintz & Kellogg,
Recent Trends in American Family History, 81 Hous. L. REv. 789 (1984).
72. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the Court struck down an Illinois statute that allowed
removal, without a hearing, of the children of an unmarried father from the father's custody upon
the mother's death. Id. at 658. The Court affirmed the father's interest in the "children he has sired
and raised." Id. at 651.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer was the first decision to suggest a constitutionally protected
interest in family privacy. The Court struck down a Nebraska law restricting the use of foreign
languages in schools; part of the Court's rationale was that the law restricted parental authority. Id.
at 400.
75. Id. at 399.
76. 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983). Lehr is consistent with the legal trend that began with Stan-
ley. In general, the courts have held that an unmarried father's relationship with his child is to be
accorded substantial legal protection if the father has assumed parental responsibility. The Supreme
Court did state in Lehr, however, that the "mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. The Lehr Court characterized the
natural father's genetic link as an "opportunity" to assume a unique relationship with the child. If
he fails to do so, he loses his parental rights. Id. at 262.
Because a natural mother undergoes pregnancy and gives birth, she may be accorded a superior
legal status over a natural father. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16. Nonetheless, she may lose this
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sumed no responsibility for his child was not entitled to notice of the
child's adoption by the mother's husband.
The right to procreate is the right to produce one's own children to
rear. The right presumes and indeed requires an intention as well as an
ability to assume the role of parent. Without this purpose and capacity,
the "right" is limited to a right to conceive, carry, and bear a child.77 To
be sure, these components of the reproductive process may have in-
dependent value to the individual. For example, a man might wish to
donate sperm to perpetuate his lineage even though the children con-
ceived will remain unknown to him. A woman might want to act as a
surrogate mother because she finds pregnancy and childbirth to be mean-
ingful and satisfying experiences. But neither of these desires, legitimate
though they may be, implicates a fundamental right. Indeed, debate con-
cerning the constitutional implications focuses on the reproductive rights
of the prospective rearing parents. 78 It is the objective of rearing the
child-of establishing a family-that elevates the right to procreate to a
lofty status.
status if she fails to care for the child. See infra notes 80-8 1; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
77. Professor Robertson describes three aspects of the right to procreate: conception, gestation
and birth, and childrearing. Robertson, supra note 23, at 408-10. In contrast to the view expressed
in this article, Professor Robertson values each aspect of the right to procreate independently and
suggests that the benefit derived from conception or gestation should not be sacrificed because the
person lacks the ability to raise a child. Id. at 413.
78. Surrogate mother contracts, in particular, have been controversial. See Robertson, Surro-
gate Mothers: Not So NovelAfterAll, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 28; Wadlington, Artifi-
cial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 479-82 (1983). Some courts
have rejected surrogate mother contracts as contrary to public policy "because they involve an ex-
change of money for the baby." Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 173-74, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441
(1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). The cases focus on the contracting couple's argument
that the contract should be upheld to protect their constitutional right of reproductive privacy. See,
e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Ky.
1986) ("The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart... of constitution-
ally protected choices."). Professor Robertson argues that infertile couples have a right to partici-
pate in noncoital cohabitative arrangements such as surrogate contracts. Robertson, supra note 23,
at 428. The infertile couple may have no other means to exercise a decision to have a child except
through some noncoital arrangement. This argument is only compelling, however, if the couple
desires a child to rear. No one argues that the surrogate mother is exercising her right to procreate
by becoming pregnant through a surrogate arrangement.
Artificial insemination by a donor (AID) is characterized not as an exercise of the donor's
reproductive rights, but as a means of providing the mother with a child. See Surrogate Parenting
Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12. This characterization is appropriate because the donor has no inten-
tion of assuming parental responsibilities. Many states have passed laws protecting the donor from
fatherly responsibilities not contemplated at the time of the contract. The Uniform Parentage Act
provides that the husband of the woman inseminated with the donor's sperm is the natural/legal
father. See U.P.A. § 5 (1986); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.111(2) (West 1980). Indeed, the sperm donor's status as natural father only becomes
legally relevant in the rare instance when he seeks to assume parental responsibilities. See. e.g.. C.M.
v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167-68, 377 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1977).
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Traditional family law also implicitly supports this analysis of the
limited nature of the right to procreate. The law favors biological par-
ents over mere caretakers, recognizing the interest that natural parents
have in pregnancy, childbirth, and the genetic link to future genera-
tions. 79 However, biological parents who cannot or will not fulfill their
responsibilities as parents lose the legal protection created by their status.
For example, abandonment of a child is grounds for termination of pa-
rental rights in every state.80 Similarly, parental neglect or abuse that is
not remediable and that results in intolerably poor child care will also
result in state intervention to remove the child and limit or extinguish the
natural parent's legal interest in the child."'
Historically, it was commonly believed that mentally retarded per-
sons were per se unable to fulfill their responsibilities as parents. Even
today, many child protection statutes list mental retardation as a factor
supporting a finding of unfitness. 82 This presumption of incompetency
79. There has traditionally been a legal presumption favoring natural parents in custody dis-
putes with third parties, even if the nonparent has been the child's primary caretaker. See Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 201, 274 N.E.2d 431, 434, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 941-42
(1971). Only if the natural parent is unfit will custody go to a nonparent over a parent. See Bennett
v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 545-46, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280-81, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823-24 (1976). The
Kansas Supreme Court struck down a statutory provision favoring the child's "psychological par-
ent" as a violation of the natural parents' fundamental right to custody. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230
Kan. 146, 153-55, 630 P.2d 1121, 1127-28 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). Many statutes,
however, give the state very broad authority to intervene in families and remove children for abuse
and neglect. See, eg., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986).
80. Abandonment statutes generally specify a period of time after which the state may termi-
nate the parent's rights. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3)(a) (Supp. 1985) (six months if
child is under age three; one year if child is over age three); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-102(3)(d),
41-3-609(l)(b) (1985) (six months); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(1)(b) (Supp. 1986) (six months);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(D) (Supp. 1986) (six months).
81. The state may terminate parental rights if the parents are unable or unwilling to remedy the
conditions or behavior that led to the child's removal. Unless the parents' behavior presents a seri-
ous threat to the child, or is clearly not remediable, most states require that before termination can
be ordered, services be provided to assist in remediation and the parent be given an opportunity to
rectify the conditions that led to removal. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(l)(c)(i), (ii)
(1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(2)(b) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.34.130(2)(a) (Supp. 1986). Many states require that the social service agency submit a foster-
care plan providing for remedial services to facilitate the child's return. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-281 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.130(2) (Supp. 1986).
If, after a reasonable period of time, parents have not demonstrated progress such as would
make the child's return feasible, the state may hold a hearing to terminate the parents' rights and
free the child for adoption. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-283(A), (C)(2) (Supp. 1986). The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the seriousness of this deprivation by requiring a clear and con-
vincing standard of proof. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
82. See KAN. STATr. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(1) (Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-
103(3)(d)(i) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.2(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986); S.C. CoDi.i ANN.
§ 20-7-1572(6) (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2) (Supp. 1986).
Courts have frequently based withdrawal of custody or termination of parental rights on par-
ents' mental retardation. See In re Jeannie Q., 32 Cal. App. 3d 288, 298-302, 107 Cal. Rptr. 646,
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has been challenged by growing evidence that some mildly retarded indi-
viduals may be able to function as adequate parents. 83 Under my analy-
sis, these individuals may have a protected interest in procreation.
The retarded person's interest in having children is more closely
linked to her intellectual and functional ability than is her interest in
avoiding pregnancy. A severely disabled person may have no affirmative
interest at all in producing offspring, if conception, gestation, birth, and
childrearing have no meaning to her. A less-impaired person may enjoy
pregnancy or express a childlike interest in the notion of having her own
child, but may be unable to care for a child due to her disability.84 A
mildly retarded person may have an interest in reproduction that approx-
imates that of the normal individual; she may desire children of her own
and may be capable of caring for them.8 5 This article takes the position
that the individual who is capable of caring for a child has a legally pro-
tectable interest in procreation, and that the individual who lacks this
capability does not.86
653-57 (1973) (state withdrawal of retarded mother's custody of five children upheld because
mother's IQ was 61 and two children showed evidence of malnutrition); In re Devine, 81111. App. 3d
314, 319-20, 401 N.E.2d 616, 620-21 (1980) (termination of parental rights upheld where father's IQ
was 63, mother's IQ was 55, and children had been neglected); In re McDonald, 201 N.W.2d 447,
449-53 (Iowa 1972) (termination of parental rights upheld where father's IQ was 74, mother's IQ
was 47, and mother was unable to cope with typical child-care problems); State v. C.N.S., 319 S.E.2d
775, 780-82 (W. Va. 1984) (termination of mentally retarded parents' rights upheld without proba-
tionary period because there was no reasonable likelihood of improvement); In re C.M., 556 P.2d
514, 519 (Wyo. 1976) (termination of parental rights upheld since retarded parents would require
full-time assistance).
83. See supra note 30. Several commentators have challenged the notion that mental retarda-
tion creates a presumption of parental unfitness. See Shaman, supra note 30, at 72-73; Wald, supra
note 28, at 14-15; Note, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and Parental Rights of Homosex-
ual, Mentally Retarded and Incarcerated Parents, 16 J. FAM. L. 797 (1978); Note, Low Intelligence
of the Parent: A New Ground for State Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship?, 13 J. FAM.
L. 379 (1974).
Some courts in recent years have viewed the capabilities of mentally retarded parents in more
positive light. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 303 S.E.2d 324 (1983) (order termi-
nating parental rights of mentally retarded parents overturned; although parents could not provide
some economic needs, they were providing for daily care and were able to summon help in emer-
gency situations), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984); see also In re L. Children,
131 Misc. 2d 81, 499 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986) (child-care agency's petition to terminate
mother's parental rights dismissed because agency had not made diligent efforts to encourage and
stengthen parental relationship and evidence failed to establish that mental retardation would pre-
clude mother from caring for child).
84. For example, W., an individual evaluated at the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the Univer-
sity of Virginia, was a severely retarded 15 year-old girl whose mother had recently had a baby. W.
treated her brother like a doll and required constant supervision when she played with him. After
her brother was born, she frequently expressed a wish for her own baby.
85. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
86. Onora O'Neill argues that the right to procreate should be contingent on a willingness and
ability to rear or to delegate childcare responsibilities. See O'Neill, Begetting. Bearing and Rearing.
in HAVING CHILDREN 26 (0. O'Neill & W. Ruddick eds. 1979). I would argue that the parent who
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Under this analysis, severely retarded individuals who are not capa-
ble of fulfilling the basic responsibilities of parenthood do not have a le-
gally protectable interest in procreation. The meaning of procreation for
such a person is limited to the satisfaction she might derive from concep-
tion, pregnancy, and birth and from producing a child who will be cared
for by others. The absence of a legally protectable interest in procreation
does not, however, mean that nonconsensual sterilization is always ap-
propriate for such a person. It does suggest that the decisionmaker
should not exaggerate the retarded person's interest in procreation when
determining whether sterilization is appropriate.
The analysis proposed here, which focuses on the retarded person's
ability to fulfill the basic responsibilities of parenthood rather than on
some absolute right to procreate, is consistent with current legal policy
regarding contraception and abortion for retarded persons. Despite
strong pronouncements in the sterilization context about the mentally
disabled person's "right to procreate," it is clear that most states permit
restrictions on the exercise of this right by retarded individuals who are
unable to function as parents. Little controversy arises when a parent
seeks to prevent a mentally disabled child from becoming pregnant.8 7
Even in those states where sterilization is barred, parents and guardians
can consent to contraception and even abortion for incompetent per-
sons.88 These laws acknowledge that the incompetent person's interest in
delegates some responsibility due to a physical disability (for example, a quadraplegic parent) may
have an interest in reproduction and parenting if she is still able to guide the child's upbringing.
However, the person who cannot fulfill any important dimension of the parental role has at most an
ephemeral interest in reproduction-one that does not merit legal recognition.
87. It is arguable that parents may not responsibly ignore a legitimate risk that their mentally
disabled child may become pregnant. Cf Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8-14, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 89-93 (1983) (institutionalized individual who became pregnant unsuccessfully sued facility
responsible for her care for failure to provide contraception). Normalization policies assume men-
tally retarded persons will use contraceptives when engaging in sexual activity.
88. The California Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law that prohibited sterilization
of a conservatee with the conservator's consent, but that permitted the conservator to consent to
contraception and abortion. See Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219
Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985). The court stated:
At present her conservators may, on Valerie's behalf, elect that she not bear or rear chil-
dren. As means of avoiding the severe psychological harm which assertedly would result
from pregnancy, they may choose abortion should she become pregnant; they may arrange
for any child Valerie might bear to be removed from her custody; and they may impose on
her other methods of contraception, including isolation from members of the opposite sex.
They are precluded from making, and Valerie from obtaining the advantage of, the one
choice that may be best for her, and which is available to all women competent to choose-
contraception through sterilization.
Id. at 161, 707 P.2d at 771, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99. Parents and guardians of mentally retarded
persons are generally authorized to consent to contraceptive and other medical treatment subject to
specific exclusions such as sterilization, psychosurgery, or electroshock treatment. See MONT. COtE
ANN. § 72-5-321(2)(c) (1985); OHio Ri.v. Coli- ANN. § 5122.271(c) (Anderson Supp. 1985); UTAi
Comi.i ANN. § 75-5-312(l)(c) (1978).
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avoiding pregnancy is more important than a theoretical interest in re-
production. Only sterilization law, responding to its unsavory history,
seems to support an unqualified interest in procreation without regard to
the person's capacity to fulfill the responsibilities of parenthood.
Defining the level of incompetency in parenting skills that signals
the absence of a protectable interest in procreation will undoubtedly be a
difficult and inexact process. 89 An erroneous decision to sterilize is prob-
ably more costly than an erroneous decision not to sterilize.90 Therefore,
the risk of error should be tipped in the direction of optimism about the
individual's potential parenting capacity. But if the retarded person is so
severely and irremediably impaired that she could never provide a child
with minimally adequate care,91 and if the state would therefore be justi-
fied in terminating her parental rights were she ever to have a child, then
she has no protectable interest in procreation.
3. Personal Autonomy and the Right to Make Reproductive
Choices. The importance of the principle of personal autonomy in de-
fining the relationship between the individual and the state is well estab-
lished in our constitutional and legal tradition.92 Legal protection of the
freedom of the individual to make personal choices about religious prac-
tice, expression of opinion, place of residence, and employment is
grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Few decisions are more
important to the individual than the decision whether or not to have
children. Thus, inherent in the substantive interests in producing and
rearing one's own children and, alternatively, in avoiding the burdens of
reproduction is the individual's interest in exercising control over repro-
89. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
90. Sterilization by vasectomy or salpingectomy may be reversible, although this factor should
not enter the decisionmaking process because it is not predictable.
91. It is the irremediable quality of the impairment that distinguishes the retarded person from
others who have failed at parenting. The fact that the normal parent has repeatedly had children
removed from her custody may be persuasive evidence of an inability to provide minimally adequate
care. Her inadequacy as a parent, however, is not necessarily irremediable; her theoretical future
interest in procreation and in bodily integrity would make involuntary sterilization unacceptable.
92. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is the classic political philosophy treatise on autonomy. State
control over individual action is legitimate, in Mill's view, only if necessary to prevent harm to
others. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 77-79 (1859). In American constitutional law, the principle of auton-
omy is the basis of many of the protections in the Bill of Rights. It inheres in the broader right of
privacy which includes both notions of autonomy and freedom from disclosure of personal facts.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). Justice Stevens has described the individual's
"interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" as central to the right of
privacy. Id. at 599-600. For an examination of the evolution and contours of the broader constitu-
tional rights of privacy and personhood, see L. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 886-990. See also Note, A
Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
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ductive decisions.93
The Supreme Court's opinions on abortion and contraception em-
phasize the constitutional status of the right to make reproductive deci-
sions free from state interference.9 4 The Court has recognized that this
interest is held by competent adults95 as well as minors who are capable
of making their own decisions.96 Neither the parents of a mature minor
nor a husband may veto a woman's right to make an autonomous choice
to obtain an abortion or continue the pregnancy. 97
Until recently, mental disability was the basis for a blanket pre-
sumption of incompetency. Even libertarians such as John Stuart Mill
assumed that retarded persons as a class (like children) were not to be
regarded as autonomous persons.98 In contrast, modem commentators
93. The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
94. See id.; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
95. The Supreme Court focused on protection of marital privacy in striking down Connecti-
cut's ban on contraceptive use in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). The Court
later held that the right extended to single persons. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452-55.
96. The Supreme Court has restricted the traditional authority of parents to make medical
decisions for their children because of the critical and urgent nature of the abortion decision and the
potential conflict of interest between parent and child. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405
(1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). In Bellotti, a plurality found that a minor was entitled to a judicial
proceeding to show that she was "mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision ... independently of her parents' wishes." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643. The Court has never
defined "maturity," and commentators have speculated whether it connotes competency to make an
informed medical decision, or some more general notion of maturity. See Scott, Adolescent's Repro-
ductive Rights: Abortion, Contraception, and Sterilization, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND
THE LAW 140 (1983). Even a young minor cannot be presumed incompetent to make her own
decisions. In City of Akron, the Court struck down an ordinance requiring parental consent to
abortion for minors under age fifteen. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 452.
The Court acknowledged traditional parental interests, however, when it upheld a Utah statute
requiring physicians to give notice to parents when they perform abortions on minors. Matheson,
450 U.S. at 411-13. Justice Powell, concurring, specifically left open the question whether this re-
quirement would apply to mature minors. Id. at 414.
97. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
98. Mill argued that the only appropriate reason for interfering with individual freedom is to
avoid harm to others. He would not tolerate paternalistic intervention in decisions by "mature and
rational human beings," even if the paternalistic act would protect one from self-harm. See J. MILL,
supra note 92, at 77-79. He specifically excluded children, and by implication mentally disabled
persons. Id. at 22 ("Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be
protected against their own actions as well as against external injury."). For commentary on the
implications of Mill's philosophy for the mentally disabled, see Monahan, John Stuart Mill on the
Liberty of the Mentally Ili: A Historical Note, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1428 (1977). See also Fein-
berg, Legal Paternalism, I CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1971). Feinberg explains that autonomous actions
and decisions must be "fully voluntary" and "chosen." Id. at I 11. Chosen actions require delibera-
tion-a process that requires time, information, and highly developed rational faculties. Id. A deci-
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have challenged the presumption that mentally retarded persons are not
able to make legally relevant decisions.99 Some observers have gone a
step further and have suggested that disabled persons may benefit from
the exercise of legal rights even if they do not fully comprehend the deci-
sions they make.1°°
The law has come to reflect these changing attitudes in some re-
spects. Mentally disabled persons are no longer presumed by the law to
be incompetent, unless they are subject to a guardianship. 10 1 Further-
more, some guardianship laws are structured so that the guardian has
authority over only a limited range of decisions that are clearly beyond
the capability of the disabled person. 10 2
Sian is not a chosen action if it is made without an understanding of its meaning and consequences.
Id. at 110-11.
Traditionally, mentally retarded persons were deemed incapable of making rational choices.
Their decisions were not chosen and, hence, not autonomous. The use of a surrogate decisionmaker
therefore did not violate autonomy. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI-
CAL ETHICS 63-64, 70-74 (1983). To the extent that the mentally disabled person is capable of
rational choice, of course, autonomous decisions are possible and the traditional approach is invalid.
99. See, eg., Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377 (1979).
Wikler asserts that relative intellectual inferiority does not provide a general justification for pater-
nalistic intervention because otherwise the liberty of normal people could be restricted and they
could be subject to the superior decisionmaking of the intellectually gifted. Id. at 380. Other au-
thors have criticized a general incompetency standard as applied to medical decisions. See C. LIDZ,
A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY
OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 221 (1984); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent
Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 413, 440-42.
100. John Garvey describes several theories that would justify ascribing constitutional freedoms
(by which he means rights that involve choices) to persons with a limited capacity to make choices.
Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1756, 1762 (1981). Insofar
as it ascribes freedoms without regard to competency in order to preserve human dignity, a laissez
faire model offers the most expansive protection. Although Garvey does not support the laissez faire
approach, he uses it to challenge traditional presumptions of incompetency. Id. at 1765. He also
identifies an instrumentalist approach, which emphasizes that the exercise of freedom may promote
the individual's development and welfare. Id. at 1768. Garvey argues that a surrogate deci-
sionmaker is needed if the choice involves significant risk or if the person is incapable of making any
choice. The disabled person can exercise freedoms free from state interference through a surrogate
who is close to the individual. Id. at 1778. Only if a concerned surrogate is lacking is the individual
subject to state authority.
101. Most laws provide that a court can appoint a guardian only after a competency hearing.
The statutes make provision for notice, the right to counsel, and the right to cross-examine. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252A.03-.10 (West 1982); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750 (Supp. 1986);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-1.8 to 1.20 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 27-11-1 (1986), § 44-10A-1 (1982). For
an overview and critique of plenary guardianship, see Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a
Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981). See also Webster, A Study of
Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D.L. REV. 45 (1984).
102. For example, a limited guardianship may give the guardian authority only to make medical
or financial decisions. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A. 11 (West 1982); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT
§ 1751 (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-1.34 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 44-IOA-2 (1982). For a
good overview with an emphasis on limited guardianship, see Sherman, Guardianship: Time for a
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Broad presumptions regarding the incompetency of mentally dis-
abled persons are not appropriate because competency can vary in two
ways. First, competency can vary according to the person's level of im-
pairment. The capacity of the mildly retarded person to make most le-
gally relevant decisions may approximate that of a normal person.
Second, competency will depend on the decision to be made; a given indi-
vidual might be competent to make some decisions but incompetent to
make others.'0 3
Even for persons who are otherwise deemed incompetent, a pre-
sumption of incompetency is inappropriate when reproductive decisions
are involved. The Supreme Court has recognized that individuals who
are not legally autonomous for some purposes can nonetheless have a
constitutionally protected interest in reproductive autonomy. The Court
has consistently held that a minor who is capable of a mature abortion
decision need not obtain the consent of her parents or the state. 104 The
traditional legal presumption favoring parental authority yields in this
situation because of the importance of the child's interest in reproductive
privacy and the potential conffict of interest between parent and child. A
decision made on the minor's behalf by a surrogate decisionmaker is ac-
ceptable only if the minor is actually incapable of making her own
decision.
In some sense, the retarded individual for whom sterilization is pro-
posed is in a similar position. She might be capable of making the repro-
ductive decision, even if she is subject to a guardianship for other
purposes. 105 Like the adolescent seeking abortion, the retarded individ-
Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 350 (1980). See also Note, Limited Guardianshipfor the Men-
tally Retarded, 8 N.M.L. REV. 231 (1978).
103. Thus, an individual might be capable of driving a car and managing simple finances, but
incapable of making an informed medical decision. This suggests the importance of basing the deter-
mination about competency on an individualized assessment of the person's ability to make the
specific decision or perform the specific function in question. Ruth Macklin and Willard Gaylin
identify three variables as relevant to determining competency: (1) the type of decision, (2) age and
transient emotional or motivational variables, and (3) potential for training for future competency.
R. MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, supra note 26, at 59.
104. See supra note 96. The comparison between minors and mentally disabled persons is in-
structive. Minors are subject to a blanket presumption that they are incompetent to make most
decisions, but the restriction on minors' autonomy is of a limited duration and consequently the
deprivation of rights may be less costly. Thus, individualized determinations regarding competency
on most specific issues may simply be too cumbersome and inefficient. See generally Weithorn,
Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 25 (1984).
The exception carved out for minors' abortion decisionmaking is justified in part because the
decision cannot be postponed and it is critically important to the minor's life. Unlike most other
health care decisions, the parents' objective cannot be presumed to be promotion of the health of the
child.
105. Most current laws require a determination about the individual's competency to make the
sterilization decision-regardless of whether she is subject to a guardianship. See supra notes 34-35.
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ual who is actually competent to exercise meaningful choice should have
a legally protected interest in reproductive autonomy.
What then constitutes meaningful reproductive choice? Three dis-
tinct decisions are involved, each of which requires a different level of
competency and intellectual functioning. First, a disabled individual
may be capable of making a meaningful decision to have a child. Second,
she may be competent to make the separate decision to forgo having a
child. Finally, if she has competently made the basic reproductive deci-
sion, she may be capable of implementing that choice through an in-
formed medical decision regarding sterilization or other forms of birth
control.
The autonomy interest of the mentally retarded person in deciding
whether to have a child is obscured under laws based on the paternalism
model because of the requirement of a threshold inquiry into whether the
person is competent to make an informed medical decision about sterili-
zation. If she is not, the law presumes that she is incapable of making the
reproductive decision and that a surrogate (the court) must weigh her
interests and make the decision for her. 106 The ability to make an in-
formed medical decision involves a level of cognitive functioning that
many mentally retarded persons lack.107 However, a person who is un-
able to make this implementing decision might nonetheless be capable of
making the underlying decision to have or to forgo having a child.10 8
This decision is fundamentally different from the medical sterilization
decision and requires different capabilities. By specifying competency to
make the medical decision as the threshold requirement, laws based on
the paternalism model distort and even foreclose the inquiry into the in-
dividual's ability to make the decision whether to have a child.
Under the autonomy model, competency to make a meaningful
choice to procreate rests on the individual's ability to fulfill the basic
responsibilities of parenthood. A mildly impaired person may have this
ability regardless of whether she is legally competent to make medical
decisions regarding sterilization. Her interest in making her own repro-
In a few states, a sterilization decision can be based on a general designation of incompetency. See
In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 271, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980).
106. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 112-18 and accompanying
text (discussing cognitive capacity needed for medical decisionmaking).
108. My colleague Ken Abraham suggests that individuals who are unable to make medical
decisions will not be competent parents because such individuals would be unable to make informed
medical decisions for their children. The point is well taken; however, if a parent could accomplish
all other critical parental tasks, some mechanism could be devised to compensate for this disability.
Moreover, the distinction between the two types of competency is useful for analytical purposes.
The most important inquiry in determining the individual's interest in reproductive autonomy is
whether she will ever want a child. The medical competency issue obscures this inquiry.
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ductive decisions should be legally protected. On the other hand, a se-
verely disabled person's childlike wish for a baby does not signify a
meaningful choice. A decision to have a child is, most importantly, a
decision to become a parent-to assume a role that requires a minimal
level of competency. If the individual lacks this capability and the state
would predictably intervene to remove any child produced in order to
protect it, then the choice to have a child is not a legally protectable
exercise in personal autonomy.10 9 Thus, the interest' in autonomy is de-
rivative of the underlying interest in having children. If the retarded in-
dividual lacks the ability to exercise the substantive interest, she lacks the
interest in making the choice.110
The disabled person also may be capable of making an autonomous
decision not to have a child. She may clearly express a stable preference
not to have a child based on a desire not to assume the burdens of preg-
nancy or the responsibilities of rearing a child. Unlike the decision to
procreate, the decision to avoid pregnancy involves an underlying sub-
stantive interest that does not itself require a minimal level of compe-
tency.111 Thus, the ability to make the decision to avoid pregnancy rests
solely on a capacity for rational decisionmaking and not on any underly-
ing functional capability. Rationality may be measured by the clarity
and consistency of the expressed preference not to have a child. The
preference may be to prevent pregnancy in the immediate future or it
may directly or indirectly reflect a desire not to have children.
The individual who is competent to make her own reproductive
choice may also be competent to implement that choice by making the
medical decision about sterilization or other contraceptive options. With
respect to the contraception decision, her autonomy interest has two
dimensions. First, the decision is an exercise of reproductive autonomy.
She is making a decision about whether to permanently or temporarily
prevent pregnancy through a chosen medical procedure. Second, the
competent individual has an overlapping but distinct interest in main-
taining control over health care decisions. She has an interest in weigh-
ing the benefits and risks to her health of various medical and surgical
109. In theory, a person who is incapable of parenting because of mental disability may be capa.
ble of making a "rational" decision to procreate reflecting a basic understanding of what it means to
have a child-costs, benefits, risks, etc. That decision has little meaning, however, if she could never
function as a parent. In reality, it is probable that few will lack the functional capability while
possessing the cognitive decisional ability.
110. The underlying interest itself often defines the individual's interest in control over making
the decision. For example, minors do not have the freedom to make the decision to marry because
they are deemed incapable of assuming the responsibility of marriage. They lack the underlying
substantive interest and therefore lack the interest in making the decision.
111. Indeed, avoiding pregnancy may promote the physical, psychological, and social welfare of
a profoundly impaired person. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at 852.
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procedures and reaching a decision whether or not to undergo a given
treatment.112 Applying the preferred legal standard, competency to give
(or withhold) informed consent to a medical procedure is based on an
appreciation of the nature and purpose of the procedure, its risks and
benefits, and its consequences in comparison with available alter-
natives. 113
Some individuals who are capable of making a meaningful reproduc-
tive decision will not be capable of making the medical decision necessary
to implement the underlying choice. 114  It has been suggested that in-
formed medical decisionmaking requires the ability to engage in formal
operational thinking. According to Piaget, this is the highest stage of
cognitive development and is achieved by normal individuals between the
ages of eleven and fourteen. 115 At this stage one has the capability to
conceptualize several abstract possibilities and consider the consequences
of various courses of action.1 6 Many mentally disabled persons lack this
capability and are thus unable either to appreciate the consequences,
112. Commentators have argued that the informed consent requirement for medical treatment is
also based on protecting personal autonomy. The individual must understand the procedure, its
risks, benefits, and alternatives in order to control what will be done to her body. See Capron,
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 364-76
(1974).
In a leading case defining the contours of modern informed consent law, Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "Anglo-American law starts
with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of
life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment." Id. at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
113. There are several standards of competency to make medical decisions. Under the lowest
standard, a competent individual is one who is capable of expressing a preference. A second stan-
dard focuses on whether the decision itself is rational; if it is, it is deemed competent. Some com-
mentators have suggested that this standard is typically used in psychiatric hospitals. The decision
to accept treatment is deemed competent; to refuse treatment suggests incompetency. See Meisel,
supra note 99, at 443-45. A third standard looks at the rationality of the decisionmaking process.
The fourth and prevailing standard is the so-called appreciation standard, which measures the pa-
tient's inferential as well as factual understanding or recall. See Weithorn, Developmental Factors
and Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES, Spring-
Summer 1982, at 85, 89-95. Several commentators have suggested that appreciation requires the
ability to think abstractly and draw inferences about the implications of the proposed treatment. See
Applebaum & Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462,
1463-65 (1981); Weithorn, supra note 104, at 35.
114. The Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of Virginia, for example, evaluated a wo-
man, B., age 35 with one child, who had over a number of years consistently said that she wanted
"no more babies." Attempts to use birth control pills and an IUD had caused substantial medical
problems. Her competency to make the sterilization decision was questionable, however, because
she could not think abstractly about permanence and about not being able to change her mind in the
future.
115. See H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 26, at 58-59.
116. See Weithorn, supra note 104, at 37. Weithorn and Campbell conducted research on the
competency of normal children to make medical decisions. They found that, by age 14, minors
reasoned about medical decisions much like adults. See Weithorn & Campbell, The Competency of
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risks, and benefits of sterilization or to weigh the alternatives. I7 If the
individual is incapable of giving informed consent to contraceptive treat-
ment, her reproductive decision may be undermined. 1 8 Therefore, the
law should facilitate her reproductive choice through a surrogate who
can consent to the medical procedure for her.
The retarded person who is competent to make autonomous repro-
ductive and medical decisions should not be subject to paternalistic su-
pervision. In light of the overriding interest in personal autonomy, the
individual should be free to weigh whatever other interests are subjec-
tively important to her, regardless of what an objective decisionmaker
would consider to be in her best interest. For example, she is free to
choose to have a child even if a medical condition makes this decision
risky. If her decision is competent, its wisdom should not be scrutinized.
4. Summary. In contrast to the paternalism model, the auton-
omy model defines the interest in reproductive autonomy both more pre-
cisely and more expansively by focusing on the person's capability to
make the reproductive choice. The mentally retarded person has an in-
terest in reproductive autonomy if she is capable of making a meaningful
decision about whether or not to have a child. Her interest in a meaning-
ful choice to procreate is derived from her substantive interest in repro-
duction. If she is capable of rearing a child, her interest in procreation
and in the decision to have children is indistinguishable from that held by
the normal person. Her interest in the decision not to have children rests
on her ability to make a meaningful choice to avoid pregnancy. The indi-
vidual who is capable of making an autonomous reproductive choice
might or might not be capable of making the implementing medical deci-
sion; this requires the cognitive ability to give or withhold informed con-
sent to the medical procedure.
Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1595-96
(1982); see also supra note 26.
117. Persons who are more than mildly retarded are unlikely to have this capability. It is un-
clear whether mildly retarded persons would be able to engage in these cognitive processes. See R.
MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, supra note 26, at 59-62. The cognitive developmental approach to mental
retardation suggests by definition that mentally retarded persons do not reach the highest stage of
cognitive development-formal operational thinking. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. I
am reluctant to engage in such a broad categorization, however, given the variations in conceptualiz-
ing both mental retardation and competency.
118. The individual described supra note 114 is a good example. Sterilization was not allowed
because she was capable of caring for her child, and thus could not meet one of the mandatory
criteria under Virginia law. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.13(4) (1982).
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B. Residual Interests of the Severely Retarded Person.
Some mentally disabled persons are not competent to make repro-
ductive decisions for themselves. A decision about sterilization made on
behalf of an individual in this category violates no interest in reproduc-
tive autonomy; when a person is incapable of making her own decision,
others must determine whether sterilization is in her best interest.11 9
Sterilization is not necessarily the appropriate choice simply because the
individual has no meaningful interest in reproduction, and therefore has
a presumptive interest in avoiding pregnancy. The desirability of the
procedure may depend on nonreproductive considerations such as medi-
cal risks and benefits, human dignity, privacy, and family continuity and
stability.
1. Medical Risks and Benefits. The person who is unable to
make her own medical decisions has an interest in a decision about con-
traception that most effectively promotes her medical needs. Risk, con-
venience, comfort, intrusiveness, and effectiveness are variables that may
be relevant in treatment choice. One option is long-term use of birth
control pills. However, this practice is generally not advised for normal
women; its medical risks are now being studied.120 Use of an intrauterine
device also entails substantial risk;121 indeed, most models have been
119. The term "best interest" is often associated with a judicial decisionmaker exercising the
state's parens patriae authority. This article uses the term to encompass decisions by parents as well.
The law's objective is for the decisionmaker, whether court or parent, to make the sterilization deci-
sion that is best for the incompetent person.
120. Oral contraceptives such as the Pill must be taken on a regular schedule and may present
several risks to the user including heart disease, diabetes, thrombophlebitis, and hypertension. See
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 49-50, 56-61. But see Sattin, Rubin, Wingo, Web-
ster & Ory, Oral Contraceptive Use and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 405
(1986) (study finding no correlation between long-term use of oral contraceptives and breast cancer).
Minor side effects such as weight gain and frequent headaches are also possible. See CONTRACEP-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 55-56.
121. IUDs are inserted into the uterus and prevent an embryo from attaching to the uterine wall.
The principle risks associated with IUDs are: discomfort, increased bleeding, spontaneous expul-
sion, increased frequency of urine and pelvic infection, and pregnancy failures. See CONTRACEP-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 202-10.
Concerns about the safety of the IUD have grown in recent years and the device may not be
available in the future. Some commentators feel that for nulliparous women (women who have
never been pregnant), the use of an IUD may double the risk of tubal infertility in comparison with
other methods of contraception. See Cramer, Schiff, Schoenbaum, Gibson, Balisle, Albrecht, Still-
man, Berger, Wilson, Stadel & Seibel, Tubal Infertility and the Intrauterine Device, 312 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 941, 947 (1985). A.H. Robins, Inc., producer of the Dalkon Shield, has incurred massive
liability in a class action settlement with women seriously injured by this device. Robins filed a
Chapter I I bankruptcy petition after incurring liability of $1.1 billion in litigation costs with 5,000
suits pending. Another manufacturer of IUDs, G.D. Searle & Co., is facing potentially disastrous
litigation. Over 600 suits were pending as of October 1985. See Glaberson, Did Searle Close Its
Eyes?. Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1985, at 120. Both Searle and Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. have removed
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withdrawn from the market. This risk is increased if the physician uses a
general anesthetic while inserting the device (a common practice with
severely retarded women because the patient may otherwise resist the
procedure). 122 The experimental drug Depo-Provera is another form of
contraception used for retarded women. 123 Again, the effects of long-
term use are unclear. Finally, if ineffective (perhaps less risky) birth con-
trol options are chosen, the risks associated with pregnancy, abortion,
and childbirth must be considered. 124 None of these contraceptive op-
tions is a clearly superior medical alternative to salpingectomy or other
nonintrusive forms of sterilization. 125 Thus, the individual's interest in
the optimal medical decision may be promoted as well by nonintrusive
forms of sterilization as by the available contraceptive alternatives.
Laws based on the paternalism model fail to separate the individ-
ual's reproductive interest from her interest in the medical decision. Be-
their IUDs from the market. The only IUD currently being sold in the United States is a little-used
device that releases hormones in much the same way as the Pill. Dulea, Liability Crisis Complicates
Contraception, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, at B8, col. 1.
122. Insertion of an IUD may be difficult with a retarded woman as some pain is involved, which
she may not understand. Some gynecologists use general anesthesia when performing this procedure
because of concern that perforation or other injury will result if the woman is agitated. See Melton
& Scott, Evaluation of Mentally Retarded Persons for Sterilization: Contributions and Limits of Psy-
chological Consultation, 15 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 34, 42 (1984).
Professors La Veck and de la Cruz, writing before the risks of IUDs became known, recom-
mended the IUD as the optimal contraceptive option for mentally retarded women since it requires
no motivation or intellectual skills. See La Veck & de ]a Cruz, Contraception for the Mentally Re-
tarded: Current Methods and Future Prospects, in HUMAN SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED 96-97 (F. de ]a Cruz & G. La Veck eds. 1973).
123. Depo-Provera is a substituted progesterone that suppresses ovulation. It is effective for
three months when injected intramuscularly. The Food and Drug Administration has not yet ap-
proved Depo-Provera for contraceptive use in the United States because it causes breast tumors in
beagles. See R. HATCHER & G. STEWART, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1982-1983, at 66-67
(1982). Use of the drug also causes minor side effects such as disruption of normal menstruation and
irregular and unpredictable bleeding. The woman may experience weight gain and a delayed return
of fertility once treatments are stopped. See id. at 67.
124. The medical risk, pain, and anxiety associated with pregnancy and birth may be greater for
one who does not understand the process and cannot look forward to the fruits of the effort. Abor-
tion has some risks that increase as the term of the pregnancy progresses. Second trimester abor-
tions have risks comparable to the risks of childbirth. See id. at 7. For teens, childbirth has five
times the mortality/morbidity rate of a first trimester abortion. Id.
125. Some forms of tubal ligation may be performed on an outpatient basis. It leaves minute
scars, involves minimal discomfort, and allows for a rapid recovery with a quick return to normal
activity, including sex. The most popular form of tubal ligation is laparoscopy, which involves ex-
tremely rare risks of hemorrhage, electric shock, perforation of organs, puncture of blood vessels and
skin, and internal burns. The current mortality rate for the laparascopic procedure is 10 deaths per
100,000 procedures. See id. at 195-96.
The only complications associated with vasectomy, an outpatient procedure, are skin discolora-
tion, swelling, pain, and hematoma (a mass of clotted blood from injured blood vessels in loose
connective tissues of the scrotum). Hematomas usually occur in less than one percent of all vasecto-
mies. See id. at 190.
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cause sterilization extinguishes reproductive capacity, it is presumed to
be inherently more intrusive and "drastic" than any nonpermanent form
of contraception, and is only allowed as a last resort. However, for the
person who has no interest in having children, some forms of sterilization
are no more "drastic" in a medical sense than other contraceptive op-
tions. For the severely disabled person who lacks a potential interest in
having children, assessment of sterilization as a treatment alternative
should be made independently of the interest in reproduction itself.
However, more intrusive forms of sterilization, such as hysterec-
tomy, are not comparable in a medical sense to other contraceptive op-
tions. Some parents might seek hysterectomy 126 for a severely retarded
daughter because she has difficulty managing menstrual hygiene tasks or
because she experiences distress with menstrual periods.1 27 In this situa-
tion, the threat to the retarded person's interest in the optimal medical
decision is greatly increased because the procedure is major surgery and
involves enhanced medical risk. Furthermore, medical judgment may
not serve its traditional protective function. Physicians can generally be
relied on to recommend the treatment that best promotes the patient's
medical welfare with minimal risk. However, a gynecologist might rec-
ommend a hysterectomy for a severely retarded young woman, based not
on the woman's gynecological needs, but on an evaluation of her intellec-
tual capabilities, an issue on which gynecologists have little expertise. To
the extent that risk is incurred beyond that indicated by her medical
needs, intrusiveness is increased and justification of the decision on the
ground that it promotes the patient's interests becomes more difficult. 128
126. Although hysterectomy is 100% effective as a method of birth control, some authorities
flatly state that because of the risks, hysterectomy is never appropriate for contraceptive purposes.
See Amirikia & Evans, Ten-year Review of Hysterectomies: Trends, Indications, and Risks, 134 AM.
J. OBsTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 431, 432-33 (1979) (study of 6400 hysterectomies described signifi-
cant complications including infection (4.7%), bleeding (1.4%), risks from transfusion (12%), blad-
der and bowel injury (0.6%), thromboembolisms (0.6%) and death (0.26%)). Usually
hysterectomies are only performed for sterilization purposes when there are other gynecologic
problems present as well. See M. SAIDI & C. ZAINIE, FEMALE STERILIZATION: A HANDBOOK FOR
WOMEN 44 (1980). Many current laws implicitly discourage hysterectomies by requiring that the
sterilization procedure chosen be the least restrictive alternative. See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.12 (1982).
127. Research indicates that moderately retarded persons with proper training can manage all
aspects of menstrual hygiene. Severely retarded women can learn all aspects except initiation. See
Hamilton, Allen, Stephens & Davall, Training Mentally Retarded Females to Use Sanitary Napkins,
MENTAL RETARDATION, Feb. 1969, at 40, 43; see also Melton & Scott, supra note 122, at 42-43.
128. A major surgical procedure with significant medical risk may be medically necessary to
save the person's life or restore her health. It is the discrepancy between the nonautonomous pa-
tient's medical needs and the risk associated with the procedure that raises concerns about whether
her welfare is promoted.
An analogous problem arises in medical research on incompetents and children. If an individ-
ual is not competent to consent to the risks of research, the procedure may represent an unwarranted
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2. Human Dignity and Privacy. The severely disabled person
who is incapable of autonomous choice has an interest in being treated
with human dignity and in avoiding unnecessary intrusions into her pri-
vacy by those who make the sterilization decision for her.129 Her dignity
interest is threatened if she is subjected to a medical procedure against
her will. Furthermore, protection of privacy requires that personal in-
quiry and disclosure in the decisionmaking process be limited, and that
only those persons whose participation is needed to make a good decision
be involved.130
Some individuals who are not capable of making their own repro-
ductive decisions will object to a proposed sterilization. Such objection
can reflect varying levels of comprehension and may have several
sources. The individual might adhere to a childlike wish for a baby. She
might be afraid of doctors, hospitals, or pain. Whatever the source of her
protest, the medical procedure will be more offensive to her dignity then
if she were agreeable. In general, any objection reflecting basic under-
standing signifies that the procedure intrudes on the individual's dignity.
Although the protest should not necessarily determine the outcome, it
does reflect an interest of the individual that should be considered in any
decision designed to promote her welfare. 31
In general, the severely retarded person has a reduced expectation of
personal privacy. Others are involved in intimate decisions affecting her
life, including medical decisions, to a greater extent than is the case with
the normal person. Even if she is capable of making her own decisions,
bodily intrusion because its purpose is not solely health promotion. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan
Dep't of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2063 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973) (involuntarily com-
mitted patient cannot consent to experimental "high risk-low benefit" psychosurgery).
129. The notion of "respect for persons" extends beyond respect for individual autonomy to a
recognition of the humanity of nonautonomous persons. In Kantian terms, persons should not be
treated as a means to another end. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 98, at 7.
130. The Supreme Court has described two dimensions of the right of privacy: independence in
making important personal decisions, and freedom to prevent disclosure of personal facts. See
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The incompetent person lacks the first dimension, but
this does not mean that the second dimension should routinely be disregarded. Many current laws
require judges, attorneys, and others to scrutinize the mentally retarded person's competency,
parenting ability, sexual activities, reproductive capacity, and contraceptive practices. See supra
notes 35-48 and accompanying text. Such scrutiny is justified only if it serves some beneficial
purpose.
131. Federal regulations governing medical research involving children recognize that an incom-
petent person's agreement or objection to a medical procedure may be significant. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.401-.409 (1985). These regulations require the parents' permission and tle minor's assent for
most types of research. Assent is not defined, but Professor Weithorn has described it as knowledge-
able agreement. Weithorn, Children's Capacities to Decide About Participation in Research, IRB,
Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 1, 2. Weithorn suggests that children become capable of assent at age six. Id. at
5. If a child capable of assent protests, the protest will be respected unless the research offers the
child a direct health benefit that is otherwise unavailable. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (1985).
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she will be allowed to do so only after intrusive scrutiny of her compe-
tency.132 Although most medical decisions will involve only her parents
or guardian and a physician, the sterilization decision often involves an
expanded group of participants. The potential for infringement of her
privacy interest is great if the law requires rigorous procedural protec-
tions and substantive findings. 133 Under the paternalism model, both in-
dividual and family privacy are largely ignored in the process of
evaluating the desirability of sterilization. Although some intrusion on
privacy is necessary, this interest should not be unnecessarily
sacrificed. 134
3. The Interest of the Retarded Person in Family Stability. Many
parents abandon or institutionalize their mentally retarded children
when the disability becomes apparent or burdensome;1 35 others place
their children in foster care. The disabled person whose parents have
accepted the responsibility of caring for her at home is very likely better
off than one subjected to any of these alternatives; she has a substantial
interest in continued care by her parents. Family stability is thus an in-
terest held by the child as well as the parents. This stability may be
affected by the level of stress that attends the burden of caring for a re-
tarded child. 136 It can be threatened by concerns about the child's sexu-
ality. The welfare of a severely retarded person who has no interest in
reproduction may be promoted if her parents' concerns about pregnancy
132. Note the parallel here to the procedures set forth in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44
(1979) (plurality opinion), for determining the maturity of the minor who seeks an abortion. For a
discussion of Bellotti, see supra note 96.
133. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
134. Application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine is relevant to intrusions into personal
privacy. See Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search
of its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100, 1102-03 (1977). Any infringement of a constitutionally
protected interest should be restricted to that necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose. Id. at
1101. This doctrine has been applied to involuntary treatment of mentally ill patients. Id. at 1102.
Civil commitment law in many states includes a directive that the least restrictive treatment be
utilized. Id. at 1112.
135. The normalization trend has encouraged parents to rear their mentally retarded children at
home. See supra note 28. Nonetheless, family stress may increase as the child grows older, and may
ultimately prompt a decision to remove the child from the home. For boys, concern among neigh-
bors about aggressiveness may be a problem. See E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 100. For girls,
the parents' dominant concern may be pregnancy.
136. For a discussion of the stresses involved for parents and siblings who live with a retarded
child, see E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 96-125. See also J. GREENFELD, A CHILD CALLED
NOAH: A FAMILY JOURNEY (1972) (personal account of father of autistic child). Families with a
mentally disabled child frequently experience marital and financial stress. See Dunlap & Hollin-
sworth, How Does a Handicapped Child Affect the Family? Implications for Practitioners, 26 FAM.
COORDINATOR 286 (1977); Sherman & Cocozza, Stress in Families of the Developmentally Disabled:
A Literature Review of Factors Affecting the Decision to Seek Out-of-Home Placements, 33 FAM.
REL. 95 (1984).
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are alleviated. Her interest in family stability is substantial and therefore
may warrant legal protection.
The individual's interest in family stability should become legally
relevant with respect to the sterilization decision only if the individual is
so seriously impaired that she will never be capable of making her own
reproductive decisions. For example, a mildly retarded young woman
whose parents respond to her promiscuous behavior by seeking steriliza-
tion might have an interest in reducing family stress; if sterilization is
proscribed, her parents might respond with abusive treatment, unreason-
able restrictions of her freedom, or even relinquishment of their parental
role. However, this young woman will one day be independent and
might at that time want to have children.137 Thus her future capability
to make decisions for herself precludes legal consideration of her present
interest in family continuity. Using sterilization to promote family sta-
bility is as offensive here as it would be in the case of a promiscuous
normal adolescent.
C. The Autonomy Model and the Deficiencies of Current Law.
The analytic framework developed in this Part suggests that current
law falls short of its objective of promoting sterilization decisions that
reflect the interests of mentally disabled persons. The preoccupation
with correcting the abuses of the past in combination with a superficial
analysis of the interests at stake has engendered significant distortions.
Three problems result from the paternalism model's presumption that
the primary interest at stake is the interest in procreation. First, in its
effort to protect the mentally retarded person from wrongful sterilization,
the law unduly restricts her right of self-determination. As I have
shown, if only persons competent to make the medical decisions are
deemed capable of making reproductive decisions for themselves, some
persons who do have an interest in autonomy will find themselves subject
to the authority of another decisionmaker. That is, an individual who is
capable of deciding the more basic issue-whether or not to have a
child-will sometimes, in the name of protection, be subject to a surro-
gate decisionmaker.
137. This situation was presented in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In that case, a
mother, prompted by concern over her teenage daughter's promiscuity, successfully petitioned a
judge for the daughter's sterilization. The daughter was described as "somewhat retarded,"
although she was promoted each year with her public school class. Id. at 351. She was told that the
surgical procedure was an appendectomy and did not learn that she had been sterilized until she
married and found that she was unable to become pregnant. Id. at 353. The daughter sued her
mother and the judge who authorized the procedure. The Supreme Court upheld the judicial immu-
nity of the judge, who had authorized the sterilization absent statutory authority. Id. at 364.
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Second, laws based on the paternalism model treat sterilization as an
infringement of the right to procreate rather than as a means of exercis-
ing the right not to procreate.138 It is ironic that a legal rule designed to
protect mentally disabled persons impairs the fundamental right to avoid
pregnancy-a right that others can exercise freely. Laws premised on a
strong presumption that every retarded person has an interest in procrea-
tion make consideration of the interest in avoiding pregnancy very diffi-
cult in some cases.
Finally, current law ignores the interest in family stability that the
severely disabled person shares with her parents. Under the paternalism
model, the parents' interest in convenience, reduced anxiety, and family
stability is not only deemed irrelevant to the decision, but is presumed to
conflict with the child's interest. This presumption is valid if an interest
in procreation exists. If no such interest exists, however, ignoring the
importance of family stability for the severely retarded person may well
lead to a decision contrary to her best interest.
The analysis proposed here offers an alternative conception of the
interests of the mentally retarded person for whom sterilization is pro-
posed. The autonomy model defines the interests of the mentally dis-
alled person in making her own reproductive decisions more broadly
and more precisely than does the paternalism model. The competent
person's interest in independent decisionmaking rests on her ability to
make the underlying reproductive choice, whether or not she can imple-
ment that choice through a medical decision. The model suggests that
the individual who is not capable of making autonomous reproductive
decisions has an interest in preserving family stability, and that this inter-
est will be promoted by state deference to parental authority.1 39 Thus, in
contrast to the paternalism model, which offers elaborate substantive cri-
teria, the autonomy model identifies the correct allocation of decision-
making authority as the means of advancing the retarded person's
interests. The autonomy model indicates that the interests of the men-
tally retarded person will be best protected by a legal rule that limits
protective state intervention and supports private decisionmaking by the
individual or, if she is incompetent to make the reproductive decision, by
her parents. The next Part examines the implications of the autonomy
model for the formulation of an optimal legal rule.
138. See supra note 50.
139. The person incapable of making her own choices has an interest in having parents make
decisions for her and in avoiding state interference. In analyzing the child's interest in parental
authority under the constitutional family privacy doctrine, Garvey aptly asserts that
"[c]onstitutional liberties protect children in the exercise of choices that their parents have made for
them." Garvey, supra note 100, at 1782.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE AUTONOMY MODEL
A. Protecting Meaningful Choice-The Retarded Person
as Decisionmaker.
Devising a legal rule that protects the expansively defined autonomy
interest of the competent retarded individual is more difficult than it
might first appear. The autonomy model suggests that three separate
inquiries are relevant: an inquiry into the individual's competency to
make the decision to have children, an inquiry into her competency to
avoid pregnancy, and an inquiry into her competency to elect ster-
ilization.
The examination of competency is further complicated in this con-
text by the unique relevance of the person'sfuture competency and inter-
est in autonomous choice. Because sterilization extinguishes repro-
ductive capacity and moots the issue of reproductive choice, the law
should preserve the disabled person's potential interest in making her
own decisions if she might become competent in the future. Thus a de-
termination of incompetency may require an evaluation of future func-
tioning that is necessarily speculative in nature.
Because incompetency may be due to developmental factors, poten-
tial competency is particularly important if the mentally retarded person
is a minor. To guard against error, sterilization might be restricted to
adults. 14° However, because severely retarded minors have a strong in-
terest in family continuity, they may particularly benefit from legal sup-
port for parental authority; a policy that proscribes their sterilization
may not serve their interests. Despite uncertainty, it is possible to make
a determination that some severely disabled minors will never have the
capacity to make reproductive decisions independently.
A person also has an interest in preserving future options if she is
competent but currently has no expressed preferences. Thus, the re-
tarded person who is potentially a capable parent should not be sterilized
on the ground that she has expressed no desire for children. Only her
stable long-term desire not to have children should be implemented
through sterilization.
When parents propose sterilization for a mentally retarded child, an
evaluation by an expert in mental retardation is necessary. One source of
erroneous sterilization decisions in the past was reliance on the attending
physician's opinion that sterilization was medically appropriate. This
140. In most states, normal minors may not obtain sterilization because of the permanency of
the procedure. Sterilization laws directed at mentally disabled persons require a determination of
future incompetency, see supra note 34, thereby distinguishing the mentally retarded minor from
other presumably incompetent normal minors.
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physician was usually a gynecologist with little or no expertise in assess-
ing the functional capabilities of mentally disabled persons. Some cur-
rent laws attempt to remedy this problem by requiring psychiatric,
psychological, or "social" evaluation of the retarded individual. 141 How-
ever, little guidance is given regarding the focus of the evaluation or the
required expertise of the evaluator. Most physicians, including psychia-
trists, have very limited expertise in mental retardation; most psycholo-
gists have only marginally more. A specific designation of expertise and
training in mental retardation would promote more accurate assessments
of competency than are likely to result under current law.
The determination of whether the disabled individual has the ability
to make her own reproductive decisions should begin with an evaluation
of her interest in procreation. Then, if she does not want children, the
competency of this choice must be assessed. If her decision to avoid
pregnancy is competently made, further inquiry is necessary to determine
whether she is capable of making the informed medical decision to imple-
ment her reproductive choice. The discussion that follows examines the
implications of positive and negative findings of competency.
1. Parenting Capacity and Reproductive Choice. The autonomy
model presumes an interest in procreation, unless the individual would
be so limited in her parenting ability that the state would be justified in
terminating her parental rights should she ever have a child. Thus,
under the autonomy model, the individual who is capable of functioning
as a minimally adequate parent will not be sterilized unless she compe-
tently chooses never to have children. Making a determination about
parenting ability will admittedly be difficult unless the person has had
substantial experience being with children.' 42
A person has the minimal capacity to function as a parent if she
would be able to meet a child's most basic needs. Thus, a parent must be
able to understand the child's basic nutritional requirements and protect
141. See supra note 38.
142. The assessment of present competency to make a decision is potentially a highly reliable
judgment. It can be compared with determinations about competency of criminal defendants to
stand trial. See R. ROESCH & S. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980). Much more
uncertain are evaluations that predict how someone will function or act in the future. See J.
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES
(1981); Melton & Scott, supra note 122, at 39.
Several types of inquiry may be useful in assessing potential parental competency. An assess-
ment of the person's actual and potential ability to care for herself is important because the person
who cannot provide for her own nutritional, health, and safety needs cannot assume responsibility
for another person. The individual's experience in caring for her own children, her siblings, or
neighborhood children is also significant. Problem-solving hypotheticals involving typical child care
issues may also be useful.
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the child from physical harm. She must be able to discern illness and
know how to obtain medical help; she should also be able to express
affection and provide adequate supervision of the child's daily routine.
The retarded person's interest in having children, however, should
not be contingent on her ability to perform other functions usually asso-
ciated with being a "good" parent.1 43 If she must demonstrate a more
sophisticated capability to provide intellectual stimulation or meet the
child's emotional needs, she will be subject to standards of competency in
parenting that are not applied to others. Although good parents typi-
cally provide an intellectually stimulating environment, many normal
parents do not. Horizontal equity thus dictates that nothing more than a
standard of minimal adequacy be required.
The individual who is not capable of functioning as a parent has no
interest in procreation and the choice to have children is not available to
her. Arguably, she might have the capability to choose among alterna-
tives for avoiding pregnancy; if so, her competent preferences should be
respected. It is unlikely, however, that a person who is incapable of be-
ing a minimally adequate parent because of mental retardation will have
the cognitive ability to consider contraceptive alternatives and make an
informed medical decision. 144 If she is incompetent, a decision will be
made for her by her parents or (in some cases) by a court.
2. Protecting the Decision to Avoid Pregnancy: Reproductive Choice
and the Medical Decision. A mentally disabled person may clearly and
unambiguously express a desire not to have children. If she understands
the implications of the decision and if it is made without coercive influ-
ence, her expressed preference should be respected by the law as a com-
143. The findings of research assessing the parental capability of mentally disabled persons are
mixed. This research involves only parents who are mildly or moderately retarded. Some observers
have suggested that the children of mentally retarded parents may suffer from a lack of intellectual
stimulation. See E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 302. An early study of mentally disabled parents
found that 42% provided adequate care for their children's physical needs, 32% provided marginal
care, and 26% provided care warranting removal. See Mickelson, The Feebleminded Parent: A
Study of90 Family Cases, 51 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 644, 645 (1947). Some researchers have
observed that although mentally retarded parents may not provide care meeting "middle class" stan-
dards, most do provide adequate care. See Murphy, Coleman & Abel, Human Sexuality in the
Mentally Retarded, in TREATMENT ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN MENTAL RETARDATION 615 (Q.
Matson & F. Andrasik eds. 1983).
Support services may be available to provide parents with training and assistance. See Mickel-
son, supra, at 644. Rosenberg and MeTate reported that mildly retarded persons who participated
in parent training programs were able to improve their parenting skills. Rosenberg & McTate, supra
note 30, at 24, 37.
144. If such a hypothetical person existed, her interest might be characterized as an interest in
controlling the health care decision, rather than an interest in controlling the reproductive decision.
In any event it would be a restricted exercise of autonomy since she is not free to choose the alterna-
tive of having children.
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petent and meaningful reproductive choice. Evaluation of the
competency of this decision should focus on the consistency, clarity, and
stability of the expressed choice and on the extent to which the decision
is an independent one.
If the disabled person is found to be making a meaningful decision
to terminate permanently her ability to have children, an examination of
her competency to make an informed medical decision regarding sterili-
zation should follow. The predominant standard defining competency to
make medical decisions, and the one applicable to sterilization decisions,
is the appreciation standard. 145 This standard requires an inquiry into
whether the individual has an inferential and factual understanding of
the procedure's purpose, consequences, risks, and benefits, as well as an
appreciation of the contraceptive alternatives available to her.
The evaluation of competency should focus on the person's under-
standing of the following: (a) the contraceptive purpose of sterilization,
(b) the nature of the procedure (the incision, hospitalization, use of anes-
thesia), (c) the permanence of reproductive incapacity following sterili-
zation, (d) the risks associated with the procedure (pain, possible
infection or other complications), and (e) the availability and important
characteristics of nonpermanent forms of contraception. 146 The individ-
ual must be provided with sufficient information about the proposed ster-
ilization to make an informed decision; a finding of incompetency should
be based not on a lack of knowledge, but only on incapacity to under-
stand the necessary information.
The doctrine of informed consent requires that the decision be vol-
untary as well as competent and informed. 147 Given the potential con-
flict of interest between parent and child, the dependence of the in-
dividual on her parents, and the observed suggestibility of retarded per-
sons, parental overbearance may be a significant possibility. Therefore,
the independence of the individual's preferences as well as the extent to
which her choices have been influenced by others must be determined.
A determination regarding the individual's competency to make the
medical decision should be made as accurately, but as unobtrusively, as
possible. A nonjudicial review of the finding that the person has compe-
tently decided on sterilization may often be desirable; however, it should
be undertaken in such a way as to minimize intrusion into the person's
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
146. See Melton & Scott, supra note 122, at 38-39. The most critical factor and the one most
mentally disabled persons are unlikely to understand is irreversibility. See infra note 149.
147. See Meisel, Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Definition of Informed Consent. 134
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 285, 286 (1977).
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privacy.1 48 Further inquiry is warranted only if competency to make the
medical decision is questionable.
Some persons may be capable of making a competent decision not to
have children but incapable of making an informed medical decision. A
person who is unable to think abstractly about decisionmaking in the
remote future might not fully understand that sterilization results in per-
manent infertility; she may, however, have unambiguously stated over
an extended period of time that she does not want to have children. This
person may be making a meaningful reproductive choice never to have
children; the inference can be drawn that permanence is desired. None-
theless, in those states that follow the paternalism model, her inability to
understand the concept of permanence would preclude a competent med-
ical decision and thus foreclose the possibility of sterilization, particu-
larly if she already has children. 149
3. Protecting Against Erroneous Decisions. The more expansive
recognition of the autonomy interest of retarded persons under the au-
tonomy model may arguably increase the risk of erroneous decisions to
sterilize. The acquiescent or well-coached person might erroneously be
characterized as making a meaningful decision to opt for sterilization.
An error of this kind is particularly costly if the person has an interest in
procreation. 50
A few safeguards will reduce this risk. A comprehensive evaluation
of the individual's decision by an expert in mental retardation is essen-
tial.15' If the person is incompetent to make the medical decision, a de-
termination that sterilization is the optimal means of implementing her
competent reproductive choice should be made. If she is potentially a
competent parent, sterilization is usually appropriate only if a normal
person in similar circumstances would choose this alternative.1 52 A
mechanism should be provided to review the findings of competency and
to determine the appropriateness of sterilization to implement the choice.
Given the reproductive interest at stake, a judicial proceeding may be
warranted. A less costly and less intrusive alternative would be review
148. See supra notes 129-30, 174.
149. For example, the patient described supra note 114 had consistently said for years that she
wanted "no more babies." There was no indication that she would ever change her mind. She could
not, however, think abstractly and hypothetically about how she might feel in the distant future.
When asked "What if you should change your mind in ten years?," she would only repeat the
assertion that she wanted a boyfriend and "no more babies."
150. See supra note 90.
151. Many current sterilization laws require evaluation by an expert. See supra note 38.
152. See supra notes 83-87.
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by a committee modeled on a hospital ethics committee. 153 Finally, since
informed consent to the medical procedure must be provided by some-
competent person, the parents' consent should be required.
4. Summary. When parents seek to have their child sterilized, an
expert in mental retardation should examine the child and assess her ca-
pacity to make reproductive choices for herself. First, the expert should
assess her interest in having children. If she has the ability to provide
minimally adequate care for a child, no further inquiry is needed; sterili-
zation should be proscribed unless she expresses a clear and independent
preference not to have children. If she lacks an interest in procreation,
the choice to have children will be unavailable to her. In most cases, a
decision will be made for her as an incompetent.
If the individual expresses a preference not to have children, the
second stage of inquiry begins with an examination of her capacity to
make this decision autonomously. If her preference represents a rational
choice, examination of her ability to make the implementing informed
medical decision should follow. If she is competent, she should be
treated like a normal person. If she is not, further assessment may be
needed to probe the stability and consistency of her decision and to deter-
mine whether sterilization represents an appropriate medical response.
Some independent review of these latter decisions is advisable.
B. The Incompetent Individual: Who Decides?
Analysis under the autonomy model indicates that the range of indi-
viduals who are competent to make reproductive decisions is broader
than current law recognizes. Some persons, however, will have no inter-
est in procreation and will be unable to make their own reproductive
choices. Under the paternalism model, they will be subject to courts as
decisionmakers; their parents are legally disqualified because of a pre-
sumed conflict of interest. The autonomy model indicates that the se-
153. For a discussion of the function of hospital ethics committees and the recommended role of
this type of committee when parents make decisions for incompetents, see infra note 174 and accom-
panying text.
There are three situations in which some kind of independent review of the competency deter-
mination may be indicated:
1) The retarded person is found competent to make the medical decision and chooses
sterilization.
2) The retarded person is found competent to make the reproductive but not the medical
decision, her decision is never to have children, and sterilization appears to best implement
her choice.
3) The retarded person is incompetent to make the reproductive decision and her parents
seek authority to make the sterilization decision.
In choosing the kind of review process, interests in individual and family privacy as well as accuracy
are relevant. See supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
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verely impaired individual lacks an interest in having children; in such
case there is no significant conflict of interest and a legal rule promoting
family privacy and supporting parental authority will best protect her
interests. Paternalistic judicial intervention should occur only when nec-
essary to ensure that the retarded individual's rights are not violated.
It is for good reason that the law traditionally recognizes parents as
decisionmakers for children.1 54 No one else knows the child as well or
cares about her as much as do her parents. Although most adults no
longer need their parents to make decisions for them, the rationale sup-
porting parental authority can still be valid with respect to incompetent
adults.1 55 For children and for many incompetent adults, substitution of
a nonparent as decisionmaker is beneficial only if there is a serious con-
flict of interest between parent and child.156
154. There is a strong tradition of legal support for parents' authority to make decisions for their
children and to generally direct their upbringing. The Supreme Court has recognized the constitu-
tional status of the interest in family privacy, and has upheld parental authority against state inter-
vention in several decisions. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (right of Amish
parents to withdraw children from school at age 14, though legal minimum age was 16); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (statute requiring that all children be sent to public
schools unreasonably interfered with the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stat-
ute forbidding the teaching of foreign languages before the eighth grade unreasonably interfered with
the right to "establish a home and bring up children").
The state may intervene to protect children if the parents' decisions or conduct threatens harm
to the child. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (statute prohibiting minor from
selling newspapers and prohibiting adult from furnishing minor with newspapers did not infringe
fourteenth amendment protected liberty). The state's parens patriae interest in the welfare of chil-
dren supports state intervention in cases of abuse and neglect.
There has been a considerable amount of scholarly commentary on the tension between family
privacy and the state's interest in protecting children. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & J. SOLNIT,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 28-133 (1979); R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE 29-64 (1978); Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
225, 281 (1979). In the first half of this century the rise of the juvenile court system and social work
movement created enthusiasm for state intervention to protect children. See generally M. LEVINE &
A. LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING SERVICES 46-47 (1970); A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAV-
ERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 45 (1977). But modern commentators have challenged the
notion that children benefit when the state intervenes to protect them from their parents. See J.
GoI.DSTEIN, A. FREUD & J. SOLNIT, supra, at 9; Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family:
Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality. 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 817 (1985); Mnookin, Foster
Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 622-26 (1973); Wald, 27 STAN. L. REV.
985, 987-89 (1975).
In recent years there has also been a recognition that the child herself may have an interest in
controlling decisions, particularly reproductive decisions, that affect her life. See supra note 104.
Thus, legal policy dealing with children may on some issues have to balance three interests: tile
state's parens patriae interest, the parents' (and child's) interest in family privacy, and tile child's
autonomy interest. See Garvey, Child, Parent, State and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the
Supreme Court's Most Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. RIFV. 769 (1978).
155. See inifra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
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1. Examining the Conflict of Interest. A constricted range of in-
terests are at stake for a severely disabled person when her parents pro-
pose sterilization. This person will never function as a parent. Mean-
ingful decisions about reproduction or about the medical means for
avoiding pregnancy are beyond her capabilities. Thus, no interest in self-
determination or in reproduction is potentially in conflict with her par-
ents' interest in seeking sterilization. The severely retarded person does,
however, have an interest in avoiding pregnancy. The physical strain of
pregnancy and the discomfort, pain, and risk of childbirth are burdens to
be avoided when the individual cannot enjoy or adequately care for a
baby. Indeed, when a severely retarded young woman is at risk of be-
coming pregnant, few question either her interest in avoiding pregnancy
or her parents' authority to protect her by employing some form of con-
traception. Beyond this, the severely impaired person has an interest in
avoiding unnecessary medical risk; any surgical or medical procedures
should be beneficial to her, and risk, discomfort, and intrusiveness should
be minimized. She also has a right to be treated with dignity. Her objec-
tions should be taken seriously, and her privacy should not be unduly
sacrificed. Finally, her interest in family functioning will often be impli-
cated because sterilization of he severely retarded person can lighten the
burden of responsibility on her parents or contribute to their determina-
tion to continue to care for her at home.
For persons who will never have an interest in reproduction, a sub-
stantial conflict of interest with their parents is likely only if the parents
seek to have a hysterectomy performed. The convenience to parents of
avoiding menstrual hygiene care may clash with the child's interest in
avoiding the substantial risk and intrusiveness that attends this surgical
procedure. If the parents propose a less intrusive form of sterilization for
their severely impaired child, no significant conflict of interest is appar-
ent. Indeed, this child and her parents have a mutual interest in avoiding
the child's pregnancy and promoting family stability. Furthermore, the
child's interest in minimizing medical risk is served as well, or nearly as
well, by sterilization as it would be by alternative contraceptive options.
2. The Costs of Withholding Parental Authority. The rigorous
procedural and substantive requirements under current law impose for-
midable costs on the family, in terms of money, time expended, and psy-
chological stress. In most states, parents seeking sterilization will have to
hire an attorney to pursue their objective. 57 They may have to pay for
157. Most parents will need the assistance of a lawyer to file the petition and present supporting
evidence. Although most laws provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child.
none provides the parent with legal assistance.
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mental health evaluations and will often be forced to miss time from
work. Furthermore, to the extent that the procedure imposes burden-
some requirements and particularly if it has an adversarial character, it
will predictably create greater tension within a family unit already sub-
ject to considerable stress.
Many parents who have struggled with the burden of caring for a
severely disabled child will understandably resent a judicial proceeding
that is premised on the notions that they are pursuing their own interest
in seeking their child's sterilization and that a judge can better decide
what is best for their child. If sterilization is denied because rigorous
substantive requirements are not met, the parents' frustration can have a
disruptive effect on their ability to care for the child. For some parents,
fear that their child may become pregnant will severely strain their abil-
ity to cope with the difficulties of caring for a retarded child. Steriliza-
tion may be a means of preserving family functioning by helping parents
meet their responsibilities; they may view it as an alternative to institu-
tionalization or foster care.158
For severely impaired individuals whose parents propose a nonin-
trusive type of sterilization, judicial scrutiny serves only one useful pur-
pose. A check is needed to ensure that the individual actually lacks any
reproductive autonomy interest. It is possible to accomplish this objec-
tive with less cost to the family and the disabled person than is the case
under current law. Indeed, as I shall argue below, some individuals can
receive adequate protection with no judicial proceeding.
Along with costly procedural protections, current law imposes bur-
densome substantive barriers. These include requirements that no tem-
porary form of contraception be workable, that the individual be cur-
rently engaging in sexual activity, and that sterilization be necessary to
preserve the physical or mental health of the individual. These criteria
are based on the assumption that a significant reproductive interest is
threatened by the sterilization initiative. As applied to a category of per-
sons without this interest, these requirements become superfluous and
serve to thwart parental efforts without offering a corresponding benefit
to the child. Thus, they can ultimately do more harm than good to the
disabled person.
The preservation of family functioning and the minimization of
stress are as important to the severely disabled person as to her parents.
To the extent that the procedural and substantive requirements under
158. In cases evaluated at the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of Virginia, parents
often expressed frustration and resentment at the expense and complex legal requirements for sterili-
zation and occasionally have said that they would give up custody if sterilization were not possible.
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current law place additional stress on the family, they represent a cost to
the subject of the sterilization initiative as well as to her parents.
3. The Constitutional Parameters: Parental Authority and Chil-
dren's Reproductive Rights. The traditional legal authority of parents
to make medical decisions for their children rests, in part, on a presump-
tion that parents are motivated to promote their children's interests. If
parental authority conflicts with an important interest of the child's, it
should be withdrawn.
Courts and commentators, emphasizing the potential for a conflict
of interest, have suggested that the retarded person's constitutional inter-
est in reproductive privacy is not protected unless parental authority is
withdrawn.15 9 It might be thought that the autonomy model violates this
interest by allowing parents to make the sterilization decision for severely
impaired children. Yet the critical interest in reproductive autonomy
that mandates protection is absent in these cases and consequently there
is no substantial ground for withdrawal of parental authority.
The Supreme Court has examined constitutional challenges to pa-
rental authority to make sensitive medical decisions for the child in two
contexts-abortion and psychiatric hospitalization. In both areas, an im-
portant interest of the child may conflict with the parents' interest, and
the presumption underlying parental authority-that parents will act in
their child's best interest-is called into question. These cases are often
pointed to by those who support withdrawal of parental authority in the
sterilization context. However, an examination of the Court's analysis in
the abortion and psychiatric hospitalization cases supports the conten-
tion that a constitutional challenge to parental authority to make the de-
cision to sterilize a severely retarded child has little merit.
a. The Abortion Rights of Minors. The mature minor who seeks
an abortion is making a meaningful reproductive choice that should be
respected. Indeed, under my analysis, this recognition should not be
contingent on her capacity to give informed consent to the medical pro-
cedure. Unless undue coercion is involved, her decision not to continue
the pregnancy warrants the withdrawal of traditional parental
authority. 160
The abortion cases present a situation in which parents and child are
in actual disagreement over the decision to abort, or in which the child is
159. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 614 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo.
1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981); Murdock, supra note 10, at 932-34;
Price & Burt, supra note 25, at 69-70; Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 10, at 955.
160. A determination that she is too immature to make this decision may lead to the paradoxical
result that her pregnancy should continue and the immature minor should become a mother.
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reluctant to consult her parents because she fears conflict. 16' Further-
more, other interests besides health are at stake here and a congruence of
interests between parent and child cannot be presumed. Therefore, the
traditional presumption that parents will make medical decisions that
promote their child's health must be set aside. It is the possible conflict
of interest and probable conflict in fact between parent and child over a
matter of critical importance to the child's life, as well as the assumption
that the child is mature and making a rational choice, that justifies the
withdrawal of parental authority.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 162 the Court rejected the notion
that absolute parental authority over a minor's abortion decision could
be justified on the basis of an interest in preserving family stability:
It is difficult ... to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his mi-
nor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will strengthen the
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance pa-
rental authority ... where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are
so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure. 163
A mildly disabled individual whose parents seek sterilization has an
interest in making autonomous reproductive choices similar to that of a
minor contemplating abortion. However, the analogy is not applicable to
a retarded person who is so disabled that she lacks the ability to make the
decision. These cases typically arise in a context that differs substantially
from that of the teenager seeking an abortion without her parents'
knowledge. If the child is significantly retarded, it is probable that her
parents have initiated the procedure; the child's response is likely to be
incomprehension or assent. Since the child has no interest in reproduc-
tion, there is no potential conflict of interest with her parents unless an
intrusive sterilization procedure is proposed. The overt, or at least im-
plicit, family conflict inherent in the abortion context is absent here.
Thus, the sterilization decision is not made in the context of the "frac-
tured" family structure discerned by the Court in Danforth. Indeed, the
sterilization initiative might represent an effort by the parents to preserve
161. In a study of 1170 teenagers who obtained abortions, the Alan Guttmacher Institute found
that approximately 55% reported that their parents were aware of their decision to abort. Of those
whose parents did not know, 23% said they would not have gone to an abortion clinic if they had
been required to tell their parents; 40% of these said they would have obtained an illegal abortion.
See Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Plan-
ning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284 (1980). Some studies have suggested that
minors overestimate the negativity of parents' reactions. See Furstenburg, The Social Consequences
of Teenage Parenthood, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 148 (1976). Nonetheless, fears can affect the minor's
behavior.
162. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
163. Id. at 75.
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family functioning and thereby continue to meet their responsibilities to-
ward their retarded child, an objective that surely promotes the interest
of the retarded person.
b. The Analogy to Psychiatric Hospitalization. The efforts of par-
ents to obtain sterilization for their retarded child are also analogous to
the efforts of parents seeking to have their reluctant child committed to a
psychiatric hospital. Involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is a coercive
medical intervention and the interests of the parents can conflict with a
constitutionally protected liberty interest held by the resisting child. In
Parham v. JR., 164 however, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute
that authorized parents to place their minor children in psychiatric hos-
pitals, refusing to require a "formal adversary pre-admission hearing" to
protect the child's liberty interest.1 65 The Court stated that "[t]he fact
that a child may balk at hospitalization ... does not diminish the par-
ents' authority to decide what is best for the child." 166
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Parham,
a significant conflict of interest is possible in this situation. The parents'
decision to hospitalize might be motivated by a desire to relieve the fam-
ily of the burden of a disruptive child. Justice Brennan argued that the
child whose parents seek to surrender custody to a state mental institu-
tion has, in effect, been "ousted from his family."' 167 The hospital may
serve as a "dumping ground" for children whose parents either cannot or
will not continue to care for them.' 68 Policy reasons for maintaining pa-
rental authority-supporting the preservation of the family unit and pro-
tecting family privacy-are less compelling in this situation.
The parents' decision to sterilize can pose a greater threat to a po-
tentially competent child's constitutionally protected interests than does
the decision to hospitalize; sterilization is permanent while psychiatric
hospitalization may be of limited duration. However, if the child is not
potentially capable of reproductive choice, she is less at risk than the
child for whom hospitalization is sought. Parents seeking sterilization
are not trying to "dump" their retarded child. Their initiative may well
164. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). For a critical analysis of this case, see Melton, Family and Mental
Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW
1983, at 151 (1983).
165. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
166. Id. at 604.
167. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 629 ("The National Institute of Mental Health recently found that only 36% of
patients below age 20 who were confined in St. Elizabeth's Hospital actually required such hospitali-
zation."). The literature does not support the majority's positive view of state mental hospitals and
their potential benefits to the unwilling minor whose parents seek her admission. See Melton, supra
note 164, at 158-59.
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be an effort to facilitate her continued care at home. Thus, potential con-
flicts of interest would seem less probable in this situation than when
psychiatric hospitalization is proposed.
Preserving parental authority to make the sterilization decision for
severely impaired children does not inherently violate a constitutionally
protected interest. The critical reproductive interest that mandates pro-
tection in abortion cases and in sterilization cases involving less disabled
persons is absent. Furthermore, the potential for conflict would appear
to be less threatening than when psychiatric hospitalization is sought by
parents-a decision that the Court has found may be appropriately made
by parents and doctors without judicial intervention. 69 Thus, some re-
tention of parental authority in these cases should pass constitutional
muster.
The interest of both parent and child in family privacy has itself
been accorded constitutional protection on both libertarian and utilita-
rian grounds.170 Sound legal policy limits state intervention in family
affairs to situations in which there is a real threat of harm to the child or
in which there is a significant conflict of interest. A parental decision to
sterilize a severely retarded child for contraceptive purposes by a nonin-
trusive procedure falls within the traditional legal and constitutional pro-
tections. Expansive paternalistic intervention by the state that does not
protect the child is not a valid exercise of parens patriae authority.
Parents who seek sterilization of adult children may seem less
clearly suitable as decisionmakers. Traditional parental authority ex-
169. The Georgia law upheld in Parham required independent review by the medical director of
the facility of the appropriateness of the admission. What the Court rejected was the need for formal
adversary hearings, which the Court characterized as "time-consuming procedural minuets."
Parham, 442 U.S. at 605. The Court found that requiring a hearing would be disruptive to the
family and would discourage parents from seeking needed treatment. Id. at 605.
170. See supra note 154. Libertarian support for family privacy is the extension to the family
unit of a belief in the primacy of the individual under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Within the family, parents are the natural decisionmakers for their minor children.
For an analysis of parental authority to make medical decisions for children, see Goldstein, Medical
Care for the Child at Risk- On State Supervention of Parental Authority, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
The utilitarian position emphasizes not so much the inviolability of the parents' liberty interest
as it does the insubstantial quality of the state interest that justifies intervention. The proposition
that children are generally better off if the state does not interfere with the family is supported by
three arguments. First, it is uncertain when parental conduct will harm children. Second, the inter-
vention may be harmful because it disrupts the child's life and family ties. Finally, the alternative
placement offered by the state may be harmful to the child because it is unclear that children benefit
from foster-care placements. In sum, family privacy should receive legal support because parens
patriae intervention may do more harm than good. Compared with the libertarian, the utilitarian
more readily accepts increased state intervention if it is demonstrably beneficial to children. Com-
pare J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1986) (libertarian approach) with Mnookin, supra note 154 (utilitarian approach).
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tends only to minors, unless a guardianship has been established. 171 Fur-
thermore, the interest in family continuity is often less compelling, since
most adult children can be expected to leave home at some point.172
Nonetheless, parental authority should be maintained in cases involving
severely retarded adults who have been cared for by parents since child-
hood. One can assume that these parents know their child better than
anyone else and that they are most concerned with her interests. If a
surrogate is needed, there is no reason to believe that a court will make
better decisions than parents in cases in which no apparent conflict of
interest exists. Even if the disabled individual may eventually leave home
to live more independently-an objective which loving parents might
promote-the parents are still the best decisionmakers for their incompe-
tent child.
4. Safeguarding Against Erroneous Decisions. The primary bar-
rier to recognizing parental authority to make sterilization decisions is
the concern that person in question will be erroneously classified as lack-
ing an interest in reproductive autonomy. The principal justification for
judicial intervention is that it reduces error and provides optimal protec-
tion of that interest. Although this protective approach imposes signifi-
cant costs on an already burdened family, it may seem necessary to
ensure that an accurate evaluation of the individual's capacities is made.
Under the autonomy model, there are two ways to reduce error
without unduly sacrificing of family privacy. The first, discussed above,
is to ensure that determinations regarding competency are made by an
expert. 173 The second involves linking the scope of judicial intervention
to the level of disability. Error can be reduced by increasing the level of
scrutiny and procedural protection in cases in which there exists an en-
hanced possibility that the individual has a reproductive interest.
Mentally disabled persons who will require lifelong care clearly lack
the capacity to care for a child. They also have a greater interest in fam-
ily continuity and stability than do those who are less disabled. Thus,
only minimal procedural requirements are desirable. If a reliable clinical
evaluation shows that the person lacks the capacity to care for herself,
little risk is created by avoiding a judicial proceeding altogether and per-
mitting the sterilization to be performed upon parental request and
authorization.
171. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
172. An objective for many retarded adults is to live in a home or apartment with a few other
disabled persons with minimal assistance and supervision. See E. SCHULMAN, supra note 26, at 65.
173. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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In the case of a less disabled person who is potentially capable of
caring for herself, but who clearly lacks an interest in reproduction, judi-
cial review is desirable if the procedural costs to the individual and her
family are outweighed by the potential for reducing error. Alternatively,
procedural costs might be reduced without unduly sacrificing accuracy
by using a less formal review forum similar to a hospital ethics commit-
tee.174 Such a committee could undertake nonadversarial review of the
expert's evaluation to ensure that it is competent, independent, and based
on all relevant information. The committee could consult with other ex-
perts or with the parents. Such a nonjudicial review mechanism would
protect family privacy and stability to a greater degree than would a judi-
cial proceeding.
If the disability is less severe, the possibility of underestimating the
interest in reproductive choice becomes greater, and the costs of proce-
dural protections become more acceptable. Thus, if the findings of the
expert raise any ambiguity about the individual's potential interest in re-
productive choice, judicial review is warranted.
174. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) review proposals for research involving human subjects
with the objective of protecting the subjects from undue harm and ensuring informed consent. Fed-
eral regulations require IRB approval of virtually all federally funded research. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.103 (1985). The committee must be diverse in membership and must include members from
diverse disciplines and different medical specialties. See id. § 46.107. See generally N. HERSHEY &
R. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE LAW 47 (1976); R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REG-
ULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 321-63 (1986). For an analysis of ethics committees and the law,
see Capron, Legal Perspectives on Institutional Ethics Committees, 11 J.C. & U.L. 417 (1985).
Ethics committees have been established in other areas to review or make recommendations
regarding medical decisions. For example, Infant Care Review Committees (ICRCs) assist in deci-
sionmaking about critically ill newborns. The current applicable HHS regulation recommends that
any health care provider receiving federal assistance establish an ICRC. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a)
(1985). The regulation includes an advisory model making the committee responsible for: (I) rec-
ommending institutional policies concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment for seriously ill newborns, (2) providing advice when life-sustaining treatment is in question,
and (3) reviewing situations where life-sustaining medical or surgical treatment has been withdrawn.
HHS recommends that the IRCRs include members from varied backgrounds such as doctors,
nurses, hospital administrators, lawyers, disability group representatives, and community members.
HHS also recommends that a medical staff member serve as chairperson. Id. § 84.55(f). In Bowel)
v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld parental authority to
elect to withhold life-sustaining treatment from seriously ill newborns and invalidated four subsec-
tions ofsection 84.55, including the subsection that required health care institutions receiving federal
funds to post notice that treatment could not be withheld from handicapped infants solely because of
their handicap. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b) (1985). Subsections (a) and (f) were not challenged, however.
See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2106 n.4. The American Academy of Pediatrics adopted guidelines for
Hospital Infant Bioethics Committees in April 1984. See American Academy of Pediatrics Guide-
lines for Infant Bioethics Committees, II J.C. & U.L. 433 (1985).
A sterilization-review committee might include mental retardation experts, gynecologists, psy-
chologists, attorneys, parents, and mental disability advocates. The committee should review the
professional assessment of competency, not decide whether sterilization is in the individual's best
interest. In performing its review, it may be necessary for the committee to speak directly with the
individual and her parents, although this may have significant privacy costs. See supra notes 129-30.
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Mandatory judicial review may also be indicated if the person pro-
tests the sterilization in any meaningful way, regardless of her level of
disability.175 The incompetent person's protest should not be a bar to her
parents' decision. Nonetheless, it would justify mandatory judicial scru-
tiny of her lack of competency.
The autonomy model contemplates a considerably more limited ju-
dicial role than does the paternalism model. Decisions made outside the
judicial process will often better serve the interests of the disabled person.
For the seriously disabled individual, family privacy and stability will be
promoted by as simple a review process as is consistent with an accurate
assessment of her interests. For the clearly competent or potentially
competent person, judicial review should only be triggered, if at all, when
sterilization is proposed as a means to implement the choice to avoid
pregnancy by a person who lacks the capacity to make the medical
decision.
There are only two situations under the autonomy model in which it
is appropriate for courts to actually decide whether sterilization is in the
best interest of the incompetent disabled person. 176 The first is when the
parents seek a hysterectomy for their child; the second is when the par-
ents who are seeking sterilization of their child have not assumed pri-
mary responsibility for her care. In both instances, the autonomy model
indicates that the interests of the individual are such that the parents can
no longer be presumed to be the best decisionmaker.
a. The Special Case of Hysterectomy. Judicial scrutiny is appro-
priate if a hysterectomy is sought because this operation subjects the indi-
vidual to major surgery that is not required for gynecological reasons.177
Parents may seek a hysterectomy for a number of reasons. Usually they
desire to end their daughter's menstrual cycles because they believe that
she is unable to manage menstrual hygiene tasks. Some parents may seek
a hysterectomy because their daughter experiences physical or psycho-
logical problems during menstruation. 178 Finally, parents may propose a
175. Some threshold of understanding may be required before judicial review is triggered; a
young child or seriously retarded person may protest a medical procedure without comprehension.
The review is a mechanism to ensure that the individual has not been wrongly classified as one who
lacks reproductive interests. Responding to the protest by invoking the judicial process signifies that
the individual's objection is respected. For an analysis of the importance of process to human dig-
nity, see Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV.
885 (1981).
176. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
178. Parents often report that their retarded daughters are unduly distressed during their periods
and are consequently difficult to manage at home and at school. Some may even react self-destruc-
tively. Thus, in some families, the girl's period may cause considerable disruption each month. In
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hysterectomy for their own and their daughter's convenience, even if the
child experiences few problems with menstruation. They may reason
that since their disabled daughter will never want to have children, a
hysterectomy is a desirable way to avoid the monthly "hassle" of men-
struation. 179 In light of the significant medical risks involved, few nor-
mal women would consider undergoing a hysterectomy purely for
convenience. Therefore, a decision to subject an incompetent individual
to this procedure cannot be justified on such relatively minor grounds.
The important inquiry when a hysterectomy is proposed is whether
the problems associated with the menstrual periods substantially inter-
fere with the individual's functioning and well-being and, if they do,
whether they are subject to remediation. Parents (and even teachers)
often underestimate the potential for training mentally disabled girls to
manage menstrual hygiene tasks and thus may exaggerate the burden.1 0
b. Petitioning Parents Who Have Relinquished Care of Their Child.
The case for supporting parental authority to make the sterilization deci-
sion is considerably weakened if the parents have put the child in an
institution or surrendered custody to a state agency. These parents may
lack the intimate concern for and knowledge about the child which, in
the case of custodial parents, supports the presumption that the parents
will act to promote the child's interest. Furthermore, there is less reason
to support the authority of parents who have not assumed the burden-
some responsibility of care for the disabled child. Moreover, some par-
ents in this situation may petition for sterilization because of pressure
from the facility where the child resides. Finally, the retarded person's
interest in family continuity and harmony is not great in this context.
Although there is less reason to support parental authority in these
cases, it does not necessarily follow that a court will always be a better
decisionmaker. A court, however, is less likely than the parents to be
subject to external pressures or be influenced by a conflict of interest in
this context. A judicial decisionmaker is arguably preferable because
there is no compelling argument that the child's interest is better pro-
tected by preserving parental authority. The court should make the deci-
sion that a reasonable and concerned parent would make to promote the
one Forensic Psychiatry Clinic case, E.'s mother reported that she was required to miss three or four
days of work each month when her severely retarded daughter had her period because E.s teacher
and sitter found E.'s inability to manage menstrual hygiene tasks so offensive that they urged E's
mother to keep her at home during these times.
179. In several of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic cases, doctors advised parents to seek hysteree-
tomy despite the absence of serious problems. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Parents
sometimes seemed unaware that hysterectomy is major surgery.
180. See supra note 127.
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child's welfare. Considerations may include the likelihood of sexual ac-
tivity and risk of pregnancy, the relative benefits to this individual of
alternative forms of contraception, and the individual's expressed or an-
ticipated preferences.
IV. CONCLUSION
The undisputed objective of sterilization law is to promote decisions
that reflect the interests of the disabled person. The autonomy model
proposed in this article offers a more accurate and precise definition of
these interests than does the paternalism model that forms the founda-
tion of current law. The paternalism model limits the mentally disabled
person's freedom through the erection of formidable barriers to steriliza-
tion. These barriers are justified by a strong presumption that the indi-
vidual has a pervasive interest, not in autonomy, but in procreation. By
clarifying the substantive interest in procreation as an interest in produc-
ing a child to rear, the autonomy model promotes a direct examination of
whether the person in fact has this interest. If the person cannot rear a
child, she lacks this interest and the law should take into account those
interests that she retains. These residual interests include interests in op-
timal medical decisions, in human dignity and privacy, and in family
stability.
The desire to correct the abuses of the past is admirable. We should
only take care that in pursuing this goal, we do not create a new set of
problems for the future. In contrast to current law, the autonomy model
accords substantial deference to personal and family autonomy. The
model reveals that the law's objectives are best met by leaving the sterili-
zation decision to the retarded person who is competent to make her own
reproductive choices, with only as much intervention as is necessary to
facilitate her decisions. For retarded persons who cannot make their
own decisions, parents-not courts-are the best surrogates.
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